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EvoCS Deliverable 7.2 
Case Study on North-West Europe  
Executive summary 
This report constitutes Deliverable 7.2 of the FP7 Security Programme project ‘Evolving Concepts of 
Security’ (EvoCS, Grant Agreement 605142). This report on Work Package 7 (WP7) of the EvoCS 
project is chronologically the second deliverable of the work package. The purpose of this deliverable 
is to report on the North-West Europe (NWE) Case Study by creating a regional profile of the North-
West region. 
Based on the analysis of the coding data of the UK, the Netherlands and France, workshop with the 
security experts from the NWE region and the review of the current national and EU level policies, 
this deliverable discusses the overall perception of security in NWE region. It demonstrates that NWE 
region shares a lot of similarities in security discourse (Table 1). The most salient core value across 
the region is physical safety and security, with the most salient security challenge being terrorism 
and cyber-crime. It also shows the differences that appear within the region as well as between the 
region and the EU level discourse of security.  
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1 Introduction 
The security policies of the European Union need to be effective (in protecting our societies), 
efficient (in the way these policies are executed), representative (for the security interests of 
different societies in the Union), in compliance with the EU legal and fundamental rights framework, 
and perceived as legitimate (by its citizens), and reflect national concerns and priorities as well as 
European ones. The EvoCS project aims to provide a kaleidoscopic and comprehensive, overview of 
the key elements of security perceptions. This will feed into the policymaking process by establishing 
the representativeness and legitimacy of European security policies and their ability to account for 
the geo-political contexts and stakeholder perspectives across which they must navigate.  
The analysis of the secondary literature, the coding and the workshop results led to the development 
of the North West Europe (NWE) region case study (with the core countries UK, the Netherlands and 
France), of the EvoCS project. This component of the project involved a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods and datasets that have been combined to identify the dimensions of 
security over time for this region. A comprehensive coding of over 1,300 relevant documents was 
also conducted using an analytical framework that is explained in Deliverable 3.1, which has included 
Government publications, Parliamentary publications, Corporate publications, Newspapers, 
Academic papers and NGO reports. Insights into the experts’ opinion on the security situation in the 
NWE were reported in Deliverable 7.1. In addition, a state-of-art literature review was carried out in 
order to create a historical trajectory of the evolution of security concept in NWE.  
The analysis of the above-mentioned datasets demonstrated that the issues, influences and trends 
are all interconnected and systemically intertwined, and it is impossible consider any political, 
economic, social or technical influence in isolation from the others. However, for the purposes of 
analysis it is useful to consider each core value as a discrete influence in order to explore how they 
come together to influence the security discourse.  
The analysis have provided insights into: the core values which are at stake (physical security, 
territorial security, economic security etc.); the perspectives of different stakeholder groups 
(including government, parliament, media, NGOs, and the private sector); the principal actors who 
are responsible for protecting these values; the key levels at which action needs to be undertaken to 
protect these values; and the ethical and human rights issues that are raised in each of the case study 
country as well as across the region.  
The aim of this deliverable is to corroborate and/or recalibrate this analysis, informing the coding 
and expert opinion from a cross-section of policy makers, academics and practitioners with existing 
literature and policy content. This approach aimed to overcome the cross-sectional nature of the 
dataset, revealing something of the provenance of the concept of security and its constituent 
components from a variety of perspectives.  
Perceptions of security are continually evolving, being shaped and re-shaped both by policy 
influences and in relation to unfolding events. In the process it is possible to distinguish not only key 
drivers of security perceptions but to identify dominant patterns which emerge as salient in different 
regions. 
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Based on the analysis of the data coding in the UK, the Netherlands and France, workshop with the 
security experts from the NWE region, and the review of the current national and EU level policies, 
this deliverable discusses the overall perception of security in NWE region. Section 2 presents the 
analysis of the case study countries by demonstrating the most salient core values and security 
challenges as well as the country analysis of the future trends. Reflecting the findings of the country 
profiles and incorporating the discussions of the workshop (see Deliverable 7.1), Section 3 presents 
the NWE regional profile and highlights the popular security discourse in the region. Section 4 
emphasises the most prominent features of the NWE that could potentially influence security 
developments in the region and the EU and help policy-makers and practitioners navigating a 
security perceptions in the NWE.  
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2. Country profiles  
2.1 Description of the North-West Europe region 
In the period after the Second World War, the NWE region has been relatively stable from the 
political and economic perspectives. Nevertheless, a number of security challenges (such as terrorism 
and natural hazards) have been affecting the region. The case study countries comprising this region 
include the UK, France and the Netherlands, however a broader regional context (based on the 
workshop, which was attended by security experts from the case study countries as well as Germany, 
Belgium, Ireland and Sweden (see Deliverable 7.1)) was also taken into account.  
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) is a sovereign state in Europe off the 
north-western coast of the European mainland. The UK consists of four countries: England, Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. The UK has an area of 243,000 km2, making it the 80th largest sovereign 
state in the world and the 11th largest in Europe. It is the 22nd most populous country, with an 
estimated population of 64.1 million. The United Kingdom is a developed country with the world's 6th 
largest economy by nominal GDP and 14th in the Human Development Index ranking. It is a 
recognised nuclear weapons state with military expenditure ranking 6th in the world. Public spending 
on security areas accounts for approximately 12% of the total budget (£728.7bn). The UK has been a 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council since its first session in 1946; it is a 
member state of the European Union and its predecessor, the European Economic Community, since 
1973, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Council of Europe, the G7, the G8, the G20, 
NATO, the OECD, and the WTO. The overarching principles of security have changed with the 
Conservative and Liberal-Democrat coalition Government coming to power in 2010, and are now 
focusing on ‘all-encompassing’ national security that addressed security ‘in the round’ incorporating 
linked areas of policy including counter terrorism, international aid and diplomacy, border and cyber 
security, and homeland defence (as opposed to a security strategy that was primarily focused on 
defence and Armed Forces).1 
France is a unitary sovereign state of the NWE and other overseas territories.  Metropolitan France 
extends from the Mediterranean Sea to the English Channel and the North Sea, and from 
the Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean covering 640,679 km2 with a population of 66.6 million. France is 
divided into 27 administrative regions (22 regions are located in metropolitan France and 5 are 
overseas); each region is further subdivided into 101 departments; 101 departments are subdivided 
into 341 arrondissements, which are subdivided into 4,051 cantons. France is a member of G8 
leading industrialised countries, it is ranked as the world's 7th and the EU's 2nd largest economy. 
France is one of the founding members of the European Union and member of UN, G20, WTO, OECD 
and NATO. France is a significant European country due to its geography and its extension from 
North to South Europe. It can be called a “trait d’union” between the Northern European countries 
and the Southern European countries: this feature is notable also bearing in mind the cultural 
background, the political establishment and the economic resources. France can be defined such as a 
mixed country due to its Northern approaches to security, defence and education as well as Southern 
approaches to the welfare state, social and health care systems, and social protection. During the last 
few decades, the cultural traditions, national milieu and social structure have been impacted by the 
continuing migration waves from the South of the country and the coastal area. France is considered 
                                                          
1 The House of Commons. UK defence and security policy: a new approach? 2010.  
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as the Europe’s second largest economy, although in the last few years the economic crisis has 
influenced the standard of living, above all in the suburbs of the metropolitan areas. France also 
plays an important role in foreign relations, starting from the decolonisation period, after the Second 
World War. 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a sovereign state consisting of four countries: the Netherlands in 
Western Europe, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten in the Caribbean. Three special municipalities in 
the Caribbean (Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius) are also part of the Netherlands. The European part 
of the Kingdom borders Germany to the east, Belgium to the south and faces the North Sea and the 
United Kingdom to the West. With an area of 41,543 km2 and a population density of 488 people per 
km2, the Netherlands is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. While 
geographically small, the Netherlands has the 6th largest economy in the Euro-zone in terms of 
nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the 24th largest economy in the world. The Netherlands 
has the 18th largest per capita income, placing it among the world most developed countries.2 The 
Netherlands is a member of numerous international organizations, including NATO, the OECD, the 
European Union, the Council of Europe and the OPCW. More recently, the Netherlands has been 
campaigning for a non-permanent seat on the United Nation Security Council for the term 2017-
2018. Recent challenges both on a national and international level have prompted the government 
to rethink its security strategy. Examples of these challenges include the effects of the economic 
crisis, the upheavals in the Middle East and the hundreds of radicalised Dutch citizens who have 
joined ISIS’s ranks, societal polarisation, terrorist attacks in European capitals, and the recent 
shooting of the Malaysian Airline MH17 over Russia – killing close to 200 Dutch citizens on board. On 
a national level, several other issues directly affecting Dutch domestic security and prosperity also 
feature on the Dutch security agenda including climate-related challenges, such as high risk of river 
and water drainage flooding and declining surface water quality, as a result of extreme intense 
precipitation and water temperatures.3 The upsurge of cyberspace related incidents, resulting in 
thefts of personal records, crucial privacy intrusion as well as frequent revelations of large-scale 
foreign industrial espionage, have all raised widespread societal concerns. These recent changes 
triggered by domestic and international tensions have topped up the national security agenda, 
prompting the country to rethink both its national and international security strategy. 
 
2.2 UK 
2.2.1 Characterisation of the core values  
Overall, 400 publications have been coded in order to identify the most salient core values (Figure 1); 
for the UK these are: 
- Physical safety and security; 
- Economic prosperity and security; 
- Environmental and ecological security. 
                                                          
2 CIA World Fact book, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nl.html 
3 http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/the-effects-of-climate-change-in-the-netherlands-2012 
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Figure 1 Security core values in the UK 
Whilst a large number of threats has been coded under each category, it became clear that the 
majority of the most salient security challenges within the core values fall under the same category 
(e.g. terrorist attack, extremism, and radicalised Britons can all be covered by ‘terrorism’); therefore 
the following themes will be explored in the following sections: 
- Terrorism (including terrorist attack, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), terrorist suspects, extremisms, jihadists, radicalised Britons); and  
- Climate change and Natural hazards (including extreme weather, flood, drought).  
Other salient security challenges which will not be discussed here but which are important for the 
overall understanding of the UK context include cybercrime, and energy and food supply.  
 
2.2.2. Description of the security challenges4  
Actors: The most prominent actors in the UK security discourse are national government, national 
parliament and general public, although they play very different roles: national government is the 
main addressor, national parliament is in the majority an addressee, and the public is seen as a main 
object of security challenges. Terrorism is the most salient security challenge (although to a different 
extent) raised by all of the addressors except think tanks and private sector, which are primarily 
discussing cyber-attacks. As the main addressors, national government and national parliament cover 
all the security challenges discussed here, whereas academia, international institutions and the EU 
have no say at all. When it comes to addressees, national parliament and the national government 
are the main recipients of the information, with the messages about all security challenges 
distributed in a more or less equal manner. It feels like the national government and national 
parliament are talking to and amongst themselves, without including many of other actors. The 
majority of actors act as addressees when it comes to climate change and natural hazards (except for 
the general public) and terrorism (except for academia). As mentioned earlier, the general public is 
seen as the main object that is vulnerable to all security challenges in pretty much equal measure. 
                                                          
4 See appendix A for the visual representation of the data 
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Interestingly, the general public have little say about security challenges such as terrorism and 
climate change and is only addressed when it comes to terrorism. All the actors (except think tanks) 
are perceived to be an object of a terrorism threat. This leads to some interesting thoughts: if the 
actors are not perceived to be an object of a specific threat, why is it spoken to about this threat? A 
good example is the national parliament who receives information about terrorism, but is never 
perceived to be an object of it. 
Levels: The most prominent level at which the identified security challenges are discussed is national, 
whereas the discussion at global level is almost non-existent: the only security challenge attributed 
to the global level is climate change and natural hazards. This security challenge is addressed on all 
levels, except transnational. All of the security challenges are mentioned at national and subnational 
(regional/ provincial) levels only. Government and parliament publications briefly touch upon some 
of the security challenges at local level: it is therefore unclear where the guidance to local authorities 
should come from. Surprisingly, businesses only mainly focus on national and international levels, 
despite their operation on local level. Most of the attention to local level is given by the newspapers 
and academics publications, although this varies depending on the security challenge: natural 
hazards and climate change is seen as a threat with the local effect by most of the sources. 
Sources: Whilst all sources cover all of the most salient core values, the situation changes slightly 
when it comes to the specific security challenges. Climate change is covered in all the sources 
(although to various degrees), and is the main focus of the NGO and business publications. 
Parliament publications discuss all of the above-mentioned security challenges, however whilst the 
main topic of parliament publications is terrorism, as an addressor they do not focus on this security 
challenge as much. The most consistent in their discussion is private sector: the share of security 
challenges in business publications correlates with their role as an addressor.  
Human rights and ethical issues: Human rights and ethical issues are mentioned when it comes to 
security challenges of terrorism and climate change, however they are hardly ever perceived as a 
main topic.  This finding may be a result of a methodological limitation, as human rights and ethical 
issues were only coded when explicitly stated. All sources raise human rights and ethical issues, 
however different publications find different security challenges as a matter of human and ethical 
concern. For instance, newspapers purely focus on terrorism, whereas parliament publications 
mention human rights and ethical issues across all of the security challenges.  
 
2.2.3. Historical trajectory 
Terrorism 
The UK policy ‘Protecting the UK against terrorism’ states: “The threat to the UK and our interests 
from international terrorism is severe. This means that a terrorist attack is highly likely. The terrorist 
threats we face now are more diverse than before, dispersed across a wider geographical area, and 
often in countries without effective governance. We therefore face an unpredictable situation, with 
potentially more frequent, less sophisticated terrorist attacks. The most significant terrorist threat to 
the UK and our interests overseas comes from the Al Qaida senior leadership based in the border 
areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and their affiliates and supporters in other areas.”5 In addition, it 
is noted that the threat from terrorists in Yemen and Somalia has significantly increased in recent 
                                                          
5 Home Office, Protecting the UK against terrorism. 2014. 
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years. This includes individuals from the UK travelling to these areas to fight and, in some cases, 
returning to the UK to plan and conduct operations. A large number of policies have been 
implemented and influenced by various terrorism events – these are highlighted in Appendix B.  
The first Terrorism Act - aimed at terrorism in general rather than being specifically focused on the 
threat from Northern Ireland and IRA - was passed in 2000; it has since been amended a number of 
times. The timings of amendments and provisions have been influenced by various events including 
9/11 attacks in the USA and the London 7/7 attacks.  
The Terrorism Act 2000 provided a very broad definition of terrorism, which included the use or 
threat of action that involves serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, 
endangering another person’s life, creating a serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a 
section of the public, and action designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic 
system.6 These actions were considered as ‘acts of terrorism’ where two conditions were met: firstly, 
the use or threat of action is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a 
section of the public; secondly, when the use or threat of action is designed to further a political, 
religious or ideological cause. 
Until 2000 the UK experience with terrorism was dominated by political violence related to Northern 
Ireland. However, after the 9/11 attacks - and based on the risk from Al-Qaida  related and inspired 
terrorism – the threat of terrorism was understood to come primarily from foreign nationals; thus 
the focus of policy was on increasing the power of investigation and gathering information as well as 
deportation or detention of foreign nationals.7 
CONTEST – the UK Government’ strategy for counter-terrorism – was introduced soon after 7/7 
(published in 2006, and then revised in 2009 and 2011) with the aim ‘to reduce the risk to the UK and 
its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with 
confidence’.8 It includes four work streams:  
- Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks;  
- Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; 
- Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and  
- Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack. 
In 2006 a new Terrorism Act was introduced, as a response to the dangers of suicide attacks and the 
mass casualties they threatened (including attacks on ‘soft’ non-military civilian targets). The 
involvement of British citizens led to a significant refocusing of policy and attention towards the 
prevention of radicalisation. This included new offences of training for terrorism and the indirect 
encouragement of terrorism. Prevent became the main stream of the counter-terrorism strategy in 
the UK, and local governments were allocated funding to work with the national government on 
preventing terrorism.9  
Since the change of the UK Government in 2010, there have been some significant changes in 
counter-terrorism policies, e.g. stop-and-search, in particular reflected in the Protection of Freedoms 
Act 2012. A revised Prevent strategy was also launched moving away from looking at preventing 
                                                          
6 HM Government, The Terrorism Act, 2000. 
7 Choudhury, T., Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: UK Background Report, 2012. Institute for Strategic Dialog.  
8 HM Government, CONTEST: the UK strategy for counter-terrorism, 2011 
9 Choudhury, T., Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: UK Background Report, 2012. Institute for Strategic Dialog. 
  
 
© EvoCS Consortium 12 For public release 
EvoCS Deliverable 7.1 
Report on the NW Europe Case Study Workshop 
violent extremism, towards non-violent extremist ideas and beyond Al-Qaida-inspired extremism to 
include other forms of extremism, including right-wing extremism.10  
The latest Counter-Terrorism and Security Act was introduced in February 2015, with the aim to 
“disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activity and then return to the UK, 
enhance the ability of operational agencies to monitor and control the actions of those who pose a 
threat, and combat the underlying ideology that feeds, supports and sanctions terrorism”.11 The main 
amendments are highlighted in Appendix B, but it is also worth noticing that the new Act requires 
schools, colleges and universities to play a greater role in preventing radicalisation. This has led to 
much criticism – particularly from academics, who argued that it threatens freedom of speech in 
higher education.12   
Climate change and natural hazards 
In the recent decade, a number of severe weather events (1998 Easter floods; 2007 Summer floods; 
2013 Heatwave; 2014 Winter storms and floods) influenced the shift in policy that covers natural 
hazards encouraging not only the improvements in emergency management, but also in prevention 
and preparedness (i.e. climate change adaptation).  
In the UK policy, climate change and natural hazards are both seen as security issues and are 
occasionally discussed together (See Appendix C from more details). The main natural hazards UK is 
prone to according to the National Risk Register are coastal and inland flooding, severe weather 
(including storms and gales, cold temperature and heavy snow, heatwaves, and droughts), severe 
effusive (gas-rich) volcanic eruptions abroad, and severe wildfires.13 
Climate change is often described to be a factor that will increase the intensity of the natural hazards 
in the future, a ‘risk multiplier’: “Building resilience will therefore need to consider the impacts of 
climate change over the lifetime of the infrastructure and make allowances for the magnitude of 
future hazards in investment decisions to secure the necessary adaptation over time”14. In addition, in 
the UK context security discourse mainly focuses on climate change adaptation; however the main 
subject of the majority of the climate change related policies is mitigation (reduction of the GHG 
emissions), thus excluding these policies from the security context.15 
A number of political leaders16 and academics17 have stated that climate change is now becoming an 
issue of national security; however National Security strategy does not describe climate change as a 
risk. UK Climate Change Risk Assessment report explains that climate change is assessed differently 
because the risk assessment focuses on the long term risks (up to the year 2100) that can aid long-
term and short term decisions on adaptation policy, whereas the National Risk Assessment focuses 
on most significant specific threats and hazards over a five year period, i.e. those that could threaten 
national security interests, and drives contingency planning for responding to and recovering from 
these threats and hazards.18  
                                                          
10 Ibid.  
11 Home Office, The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 2015 
12Counter-terrorism and security bill is a threat to freedom of speech at universities. The Guardian, 2nd Feb. 2015.  
 http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/feb/02/counter-terrorism-security-bill-threat-freedom-of-speech-universities 
13 Cabinet Office, National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies, 2013. 
14 Ibid, p.28 
15 Bowen, A. and Rydge, J., Climate Change Policy in the UK, 2011 
16 Helm, T., Ed Miliband: 'Britain is sleepwalking to a climate crisis', The Guardian, 15 Feb. 2014 
17 Harris, K., Climate change in UK security policy: implications for development assistance?, 2012 
18 HM Government, UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report, 2012.  
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The UK Climate Change Programme was put in place in 1994 with the aim to return carbon emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2000, and further reduce the emissions to 80% of 1990 levels by 2010.19 It became 
apparent in 2006 that the 2010 target would not be met; this led to the introduction of the 2008 
Climate Change Act, which changed the targets to 80% reduction by 2050. However, the adaptation 
was given more attention too: this led to the creation of the Climate Change Risk Assessment (to be 
carried out every five years starting in 2012) and, as a result The National Adaptation Programme 
was established. The main focus of the National Adaptation Programme is on flooding; however a 
number of other challenges that are also noticed in the National Risk assessment are listed: 
- Hotter summers present significant health risks; 
- Increasing pressure on the UK’s water resources; 
- Increases in drought and some pest and diseases could reduce timber yields and quality.  
Another side of climate change as a security issue is the prospect of conflict stimulated by changes in 
social systems driven by actual or perceived climate impacts; this however is not widely discussed in 
the UK security policy.20 The Climate Change Risk Assessment states that it “has mainly examined the 
risks of a changing climate in the UK – not to the UK from abroad”.21 The 2011 Building Stability 
Overseas Strategy does not give much attention to the mechanisms for dealing with the suggested 
security challenge of climate change either.22 The Foresight report ‘International Dimensions of 
Climate Change’ however explicitly discusses the implications of global climate change for the UK 
security; these include:23 
- an increase in failed states and ungovernable spaces acting as a source of growing insurgent 
and terrorist activity;  
- an increase in calls for international interventions in regions where tensions have been 
exacerbated;  
- more calls for international humanitarian assistance and contingency arrangements are 
made; 
- as a result of more severe and widespread impacts from climate change impacts overseas, 
UK domestic protests increase, for example due to unrest spread through diaspora 
communities;  
- the expansion of civil nuclear power as nations attempt to decarbonise their energy 
generation leads to greater risk of nuclear proliferation;  
- future defence planning fails to incorporate the full impacts of climate change;  
- tensions in the Arctic region present potential trade and conflict risks to the UK. 
There is evidence to suggest climate change has been ‘securitised’, in a sense that there has been a 
(re)framing of climate change from an environmental/developmental to a security perspective. 
However, a subsequent change in practice, programming and funding has not yet occurred. The 
inclusion of climate change and natural hazards into the National Security strategy is a recent 
development. For example, the MOD Strategic Defence Review of 1998 mentions neither climate 
change nor natural hazards. The 2008 National Security Strategy and its 2010 update, however, 
                                                          
19 Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Climate Change, The UK Programme, 2000 
20 Barnett, J. and Adger, W.N., Climate change, human security and violent conflict.  Political geography, 26 (6), 2007,  639-55.  
21 HM Government, UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report, 2012, p. 9 
22 DFID, Building stability overseas strategy, 2011.  
23 Foresight, International Dimensions of Climate Change. The Government Office for Science, London, 2011. 
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outline a range of climate security-related ‘threats’ (i.e. the security implications of climate 
change).24 
 
2.2.4. Overview of current trends  
The current National Security Strategy was published on the 18th October 2010; its purpose being the 
use of ‘all our national capabilities to build Britain’s prosperity, extend our nation’s influence in the 
world and strengthen our security’.25 Two main objectives of the newly introduced National Security 
Strategy are: 
- Ensuring a secure and resilience UK by protecting the population, economy, infrastructure 
and territory from all major risks; and 
- Shaping a stable world.  
All of the most salient core values and the identified groups of the most prominent security 
challenges are present in the National Security Strategy, although their salience within it varies. Main 
areas of the UK security agenda26 are based on the national Security Risk Assessment and include the 
following areas of security:  
- Strategic defence 
- Terrorism  
- Cyber security  
- Civil emergencies 
- Fragile and conflict-affected states  
- Energy security  
- Border security  
- Organised crime  
- Counter proliferation and Arms control  
These areas are divided into three tiers depending on the likelihood and impact. The most prominent 
security challenges identified using the EvoCS coding methodology align with the UK security threats:  
- Terrorism is listed as the highest priority risk (Tier 1 risk); this will remain on the 
priority list for 5 years. The National Security Strategy states that the principal threat is international 
terrorism (in particular Al Qaida, its affiliates and those inspired by their ideology), however different 
types of attacks are expected. As such, lone terrorists (‘lone wolves’) are hard to detect and thus 
difficult to prevent. The activities of residual terrorism groups are on the increase and are unlikely to 
decrease in the nearest future. All of these threats within the terrorism theme have been identified 
as a part of the coding. One more threat that has been identified is radicalised Britons, which are not 
explicitly addressed in the National Security Strategy; this is probably due to fact that this issue has 
become prominent very recently (2014-2015) and thus may be addressed in the next risk 
assessment.  
                                                          
24 Harris, K., Climate change in UK security policy: implications for development assistance?, 2012. 
25 Ibid.  
26 The House of Commons. UK defence and security policy: a new approach? 2010. 
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- Natural hazards such as flooding are the highest priority risk (Tier 1 risk), due to the 
high impact and disruption they can cause. Whilst the Strategy only focuses on floods, the National 
Risk Register also lists storms and gales, drought, severe effusive (gas-rich) volcanic eruptions abroad, 
low temperatures and heavy snow, heatwaves, and severe wildfires (which is categorised as a newly 
assessed risk).27 Some of these have been addressed in the coding. Natural hazards are grouped 
together with major accidents and human pandemic disease, which were not as prominent in the 
coding results. This can be due to the timeframe the coding was focused upon: no major accidents 
happened in the UK during the investigated year; similarly whilst the pandemic diseases (e.g. were 
Ebola) were discussed, they did not have much relevance to the UK (e.g. the case of Ebola in the UK 
happened after the coding was completed).  
- Climate change is not included in the Tiers of risks but is a security issue (which is 
aligned with the EC security concerns): “Our security is vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
and its impacts on food and water”, concluding that “the physical effects of climate change are likely 
to become increasingly significant as a ‘risk multiplier’, exacerbating existing tensions around the 
world”28. 
Judging by the review of the government policies and reports and the academic literature, all of the 
most prominent security challenges will remain salient in the nearest future. The National Security 
Strategy acknowledges all these security challenges are long-term and cannot be seen as stagnant: 
the risks in Tiers 2 and 3 can become more pressing and reach Tier 1. Thus all of the security 
challenges discussed here are significant and require government action to present and mitigate the 
risks.29 
As expected, government institutions are seen as prominent actors with regards to all the security 
challenges; such prominence may be explained by their authorship of the National Security Strategy. 
Another important actor is the private sector, but the focus around different security challenges is 
different; here the main themes are climate change and natural hazards, and cyber-attacks. Most 
likely, the events and the impacts of the events covered under these themes may have the largest 
impact on the business continuity. The media tends to go for high visibility high impact security 
challenges –e.g. terrorism – which can potentially create good headlines. An interesting if not strange 
picture appears when looking at the think tanks: the main focus of their discussion is on the cyber-
attacks, however it seems like the security challenges they are perceived to be most vulnerable to is 
climate change and natural hazards. This result is probably due to the low number of mentions of 
think tanks and therefore should not be seen as a significant observation. 
Terrorism – and in particular radicalisation (although there is an argument that ISIL is losing its 
power)30 is a long-term security challenge, which also has a long history, although the shifts in the 
way terrorism perceived and addressed have been made. The results of the coding have 
demonstrated that whilst there is a lot of focus on new terrorism threats (such as ISIL), the old 
threats – IRA – are not forgotten and still play an important role in terrorism discourse.  The policy on 
security measures is responsive and is usually triggered by the terrorist attacks, whereas the focus of 
the debate is on the potential terrorists, including radicalised Britons. Media pays a lot of attention to 
                                                          
27  Ibid.  
28 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. UK: The Stationery Office, 2010. 
29 Ibid. 
30 The Economist, Spreading fear, losing ground, 21st March 2015.  
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terrorism stories (in particular to near-miss incidents), which possibly have an influence on how the 
issue of terrorism is perceived by the general public. Popular discourse is debating regulatory 
framework for counter-terrorism: whilst some argue that regulatory framework has to be stricter in 
order to prevent future incidents, others believe that current policies and laws implemented by the 
UK government are too tough and go against human rights and ethics. Terrorism is mainly discussed 
in the national context, however the international context is seen as a root of the problem. The 
popular discourse perception is that the national government should be responsible for addressing 
the issue of terrorism, and the government demonstrates its commitment to mitigating the risks by 
introducing a large variety of policies and regulations, however all of these are very high level and 
general. In reality the national government expects local governments to respond to the threat, 
particularly in the emergency situations.  
The context in which climate change is discussed is very similar to the one of terrorism: the 
government is perceived to be the main actor responsible to addressing the security challenge, 
however the discourse at a national level is generic. The government also emphasises that since the 
impacts of natural hazards mainly affect local level, it is the local level actors who should be 
responsible for addressing these challenges. Climate change and natural hazards are connected to 
other security challenges, in particular food and energy supply, and thus will remain salient, but 
climate change will get less attention as its impacts are not immediate/ obvious. Natural hazards on 
the other hand often become a priority (reactively). Climate change will be hard to securitise because 
it is understood very differently by different government departments (with the environmental side 
of it being predominant).  
Overall – taking into account the nature of the coded publications – it was anticipated that the 
national level would somehow be more prominent than other levels, with all the security challenges 
being discussed at the national level. It is however surprising to see the local level playing such a 
small role in the discussion on security. This may be explained by the fact that in recent years security 
has become a responsibility of local authorities (under the flag of ‘resilience’), the views of which 
have not been considered in this analytical framework.31  
In the majority of cases, the government institutions give a more general picture, whereas other 
sources focus on specific stories/ objects affected by the discussed security challenges. For example, 
although terrorism is discussed greatly by the government institutions and the newspapers, the focus 
of these discussions is slightly different: while the government focuses on terrorism and extremism in 
general, the newspapers make it more ‘personal’ by talking about ‘suspects’ and ‘Britons’. It also 
appears that whist the government institutions and newspaper articles talk about the causes, the 
private sector and NGOs focus on impacts (e.g. failures, disruption).  
With a large number of actors involved in, and affected by, security challenges at different levels, it is 
becoming more and more difficult to clearly identify security dimensions.32 The political, governance, 
                                                          
31 In order to provide the consistency in coding, the methodology required the coding of the documents in which the term 
‘security’ was explicitly stated. Thus the documents in which the term ‘resilience’ was used as a synonym of ‘security’ were not 
coded. More information about the coding methodology can be found in: Sweijs, T. et al. Assessing evolving concepts of 
security. EvoCS project Deliverable 3.1. 2015.   
32 Chmutina, K. Bosher, L., Dainty, A. et al. (2015) D7.1 – Report on North-West Europe regional workshop. Available at: 
http://evocs-project.eu/deliverables 
  
 
© EvoCS Consortium 17 For public release 
EvoCS Deliverable 7.1 
Report on the NW Europe Case Study Workshop 
economic, physical, social, environmental and other dimensions of security are interconnected and 
form a complex system of inter- and intra - dependent networks  that mutually support each other. 
 
2.3 France  
2.3.1 Characterisation of the core values  
The coding analysis demonstrates that in France physical safety and security is the most salient core 
value. Other significant core values are social stability and security, political stability and security, and 
information and cyber security (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 Core values 
The social and economic security core values are highly interrelated in the beliefs and matters that 
they have to face. These findings can be understood taking into account the overall European 
situation of the current economic crisis and consequent financial losses, political instability, national 
government weakness and the meltdown of social protection, social and health care systems. 
Under these core values, the most prominent security threats identified are:  
- Terrorism (including attacks on  infrastructure);  
- Social instability and lack of social protection related to the economic security issues and the 
core values of social stability (i.e. social order, welfare state system, health care system; 
unemployment); and   
- Natural hazards (including flooding; pandemic; natural hazards related to environmental 
crime or those caused by the absence of natural resources protection).  
Other important security challenges include crimes and all illegal acts that can be caused at a local or 
national level; immigration; international alliances; government stability; social and health care 
systems; lack of economic resources.  
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2.2.2. Description of the security challenges  
Actors: The National Government and the Parliament are the two main actors involved in the 
communication and information of risk and security perception: they play a “double role” because 
they are at the same time addressor and addressee for security issues. The main security challenges 
addressed by the National Government are terrorist attacks; cyber-attacks; attacks on France’s 
scientific and technical potential (i.e. the French energy supply chain); and organised crime. These 
and other security challenges are addressed by the National Government and its specific 
Commissions. They play an important operative role aimed at developing emergency response and 
management.   
Specifically, the focus of the National Government is on the security challenges mainly related to the 
physical security; national Parliament, whilst discussing physical safety and security (such as cyber-
crime and terrorism), also pays attention to the security challenges relevant to political stability as 
well as ‘softer’ issues, such as the military cooperation and the military defense; the forest 
degradation caused by human related actions; social security. It is important to consider that the 
national Parliament can be identify as an addressee, but there is a continuing debate with national 
Government about the establishment of a complete overview of the legal framework and National 
operative capacities to respond to these specific security challenges. 
As an addressor, the role of media is to communicate public opinion and to construct social and 
collective risk and security perceptions thus playing a role of communication channel between 
general public and public agency aimed at addressing security needs. Thus the main security 
challenges the media discusses are those of high visibility and primary interest to the general public, 
including social security and stability; Internet security; road security at national level; new national 
plan on railway security et. The peculiarity of the role of media is that they are not the direct 
addressee of the security challenges and their consequences. Their role can be described such as 
“vicarious” aimed at building a collective image of the threat itself that can be socialise with other 
citizens or professionals.  
The main addressees are also the national Government and the national Parliament. Specifically 
national Government and the national Parliament seem to be affected by a reflexive approach due to 
their double role played in addressing and responding to the object of the security challenges 
themselves. Therefore they can also be considered responsible for addressing these security 
challenges, promoting a public debate on security challenges both at national and international 
levels. Media however is not perceived to be responsible for addressing the security challenges they 
discuss.   
The analysis of coding data shows that specific actors tend to cover specific security challenges. For 
instance, food security or humanitarian crises are considered by NGOs while the academic sector 
does not pay much attention to these topics. Furthermore national Government and the national 
Parliament are focused on international relationships and matters concerning social and health care 
systems. 
The general public plays a role of spectators, demanding protection or response for its security 
needs. It doesn’t play a participative role in the construction of the security and defence agenda due 
to political and legislative limits.  
The main object of the most prominent security challenges is general public. However other objects 
such as national government and civil society are also mentioned. After the 2008 economic crisis, 
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individual and people feel the lack of social protection and the difficulty to avail themselves of the 
social service or for instance social security check. Another object which has been stricken by the 
economic crisis is the industrial sector and its negative influence on the national social system.  
Levels: Regarding the main levels at which the most prominent security challenges are discussed it is 
possible to distinctly identify that they are considered both at a national and international levels due 
to their specific features. The security challenges such as foreign terrorist attacks are addressed at an 
international level while social protection and health care system are addressed at a national level.  
Regional and local levels are underestimated in connection with the main security challenges 
identified above, despite the fact that the security challenges would have the largest impact on the 
local level. Surprisingly, even media sources mainly focus on international and national levels instead 
of a local level.    
Sources: The main sources that cover the identified security challenges are publications by 
government agencies, government speeches, parliamentary publications, newspapers (both daily and 
weekly), private sector security reports and NGO’s reports. The sources, in particular government 
and academic, have a typical feature of self-reflexivity: it is quite frequent that the same sources are 
both addressor and addressee of the security challenge, probably making public opinion confused on 
the information received. Table 2 demonstrates the focus on various sources.  
Table 2 Sources and security challenges  
Sources Security challenges 
1.Government Policy Documents Terrorist attacks; international relationships; international 
crises; cyber terrorism; crime; local crime  
2. Parliament Publications Social protection; health care system; unemployment benefit; 
road security 
3. Newspaper articles Terrorist attacks; flood; internet security; social protection; 
economic security; political stability; surveillance 
4. Corporate publications Economic security and prosperity; infrastructural vulnerability; 
internet security; cyber attacks 
5.Non-governmental 
organization reports 
Human trafficking; illegal migration; social protection; food 
security; social protection; health system  
6. Academic Papers  Terrorist attacks; international relationships; national security; 
military cooperation; political collaboration; video surveillance  
 
Human rights and ethical issues: Human rights and ethical issues are not well represented in any of 
the sources. Although terrorist attacks could be seen as closely related to human rights and ethical 
issues, this was not explicitly discussed by the government publications. Human rights are largely 
mentioned in NGO’s reports and quite often in the academic papers, and are mainly discussed when 
it comes to the environmental and natural hazards. 
A specific attention needs to be paid to the security challenges such as immigration waves, local 
crime and terrorist attacks. These security challenges and their related issue of human rights are not 
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explicitly mentioned in the sources considered for the coding. On the contrary these security 
challenges and most importantly, their negative consequences and effects continue to be a relevant 
topic for human rights and ethical issue.   
For instance, terrorist attacks is not explicitly mentioned by none of the sources coded such as a 
relevant topic of human rights and ethical issues, but the related issue of human smuggling is a 
relevant topic for human rights.  
 
2.2.3. Historical trajectory 
In the last ten years, the evolution of the security concept in France has been affected by different 
factors such as: a political meltdown, economic crisis, immigration waves, social and urban disorder 
(see Appendix D for the list of the events that had the most prominent effect on the current security 
discourse).33 An important source to better understand the changes within the fight against terrorism 
is the policy document “La France face au terrorisme”, which explains the new strategy of terrorism 
attacks, their resources and the new methods of fighting this global phenomena34.  
In order to understand the historical trajectories and the evolution of the security concept, it is 
worthwhile to consider the milestones of the French national policy documents such as: the French 
White Paper 2008 edition,35 the Information systems defence and security France’s strategy 36and 
the French White Paper 2013 edition.37 
As stated in the French White Paper 2008 edition38: “The post-Cold War era is over. Globalisation 
now structures international relations. A new appraisal was in order.” It is clearly explained that a 
new different strategies for crisis and terrorism management is needed.  The aims of the first edition 
were: “the White Paper substantially redefines French strategy in a 15-year perspective, embracing 
both defence and national security. It includes foreign security and domestic security, military means 
and civilian tools. It responds to risks emanating from either states or non-state actors. In an all-
hazards approach, it deals with active, deliberate threats but also with the security implications of 
major disasters and catastrophes of a non-intentional nature.” This definition and tasks support the 
result both of the coding process and desk research.  
In France, the defence and national security strategies is considered a political issue to be analysed 
and contemplates both at national39 and international levels.  The national overview is influenced by 
the departmental structure of the national State itself, the cultural and historical backgrounds, the 
                                                          
33 La documentation Française. La France face au terrorisme, Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au 
terrorisme. 2006 
34 General Assembly 04th June 2014,  Rapport fait au nom del la Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la legislation et 
de l’administration générale de la République sur la proposition de Loi (n° 1907) DE MM. Guillaume LARRIVÉ, Éric CIOTTI, 
Philippe GOUJON et Olivier MARLEIX, Renforçant la lutte contre l’apologie du terrorisme sur internet, PAR M. Guillaume 
LARRIVÉ 
35 Présidence de la République, The French White Paper on defence and national security, 2008 edition  
36 Premier Ministre – Agence nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information, Information systems defence and 
security France’s strategy, 2011 
37 François Hollande President of the French Republic, French White Paper, Defence and National Security, 2013 edition  
38 Page 3, English edition 
http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense
_875/index.html 
39 SGDSN, Partie publique du Plan gouvernemental de vigilance, de prévention et de protection face aux menaces d’actions 
terroristes, Vigipirate, 17th January 2014  
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national legal framework, the relationship between the central level (i.e. National government) and 
the regional department. 
Terrorism 
The first relevant event that occurred in France on 24th December 1994, was the hijacking of the Air 
France flight 8969 by the Armed Islamic Group at Houari Boumedienne Airport (Algiers, Algeria). This 
is an historical milestone that helps to understand the evolution of addressing terrorist threats in 
France, considering the last terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015.  
 In France terrorist attacks and related issues are not a new challenge.  As has been stated by Engene, 
France has been affected by terrorist threat: “This extended time frame allows for inclusion of 
important terrorist campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s, now largely forgotten, such as the OAS 
[Organisation Armée secrete] campaign in France.” 40 This campaign was primarily focused on the 
preservation of French colonial experience in Algeria. This points out a specific feature of French 
terrorism threat: the strong connection between national politics and policy and the international 
affairs and relationships. Specifically the perception, public debates and government policies of 
French terrorist threat seems to be affected by the effects caused by its international or bilateral 
relationships.  
Taking into account the events considered for the analysis starting from 1994 (see Appendix D), it is 
possible to draw attention to the fil rouge of the events themselves. For instance the Air France flight 
8969 was one of the most important evidence of this connection and its effects and impact on the 
French nation. Another key feature is its long term and its permanent attention on this security 
challenge: Pujades and Salam41 consider the Jihad as a source of terrorist threat for France, with 
radical Islam and its radicalisation having effects on specific social groups such as the youth.  
The most relevant policy document related to terrorist threats in France is the fourth French White 
Paper on security and defense42. The first was published in 197243  with the main focus on public 
order, the international relationships and politics, defense and security. Such focus was due to the 
historical time and the Cold War significance that influenced the Atlantic Alliance and its common 
goals. The second White Paper was published in 199444 and stated the cultural, governmental and 
international changes occurred in the last 15 years. Particularly it maintains the same fil rouge 
previously mentioned: attention was paid to international alliance, European Union and national 
defense. These were treated as the main three pillars of the French political discourse on security 
and defense.  
In this context, terrorism becomes the new vulnerability that the French nation has to face. 
Specifically terrorism was defined such as the main no military action that can impact the French 
society and its security discourse.45 The documents also focus on the typology of terrorist attacks and 
                                                          
40Jan Oskar Engene (2007), Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: the TWEED Dataset, Journal of Peace Research, 44, (1), 
109–121 
41 Pujades, D., & Salam, A. (1995). La tentation du Jihad. L’Islam radical en France. J.C. Lattes. 
42 http://www.vie-publique.fr/focus/defense-securite-quatre-livres-blancs-1972-2013.html 
43 http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/archives-Livre-blanc-1972.html 
44 http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/archives-Livre-blanc-1994.html 
45 Page 22, http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/archives-Livre-blanc-1994.html 
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their features. The third French White Paper on security and defense was released on 200846 after 
the Twin Tower attacks in 2001 that changed the perspectives and approaches to the security issues 
and their impacts. According to this document, the main innovation was the focus on the prevention 
and related activities. It is not only aimed at fighting the various threats to the national security, but 
also it is conceived such as a planning documents in order to prevent the threats at national level as 
well as those related to foreign policies.  
The latest French White Paper released in 201347 states the importance of “means for prevention 
and management of crises”48 that is more detailed than in the previous documents.  Furthermore, 
terrorism issue is become a current and permanent security challenges that the French nation needs 
to face.  
Based on the analysis of these and other terrorism related policies, the following key features of the 
terrorism policy can be highlighted: 
- a gap between the perception of general public and political discourse; 
- focus on international relationships and alliance; 
- focus on European Union and the national perspective for the security challenges; 
- the recognition of the new vulnerability such as terrorist threats. 
Finally, it is possible to sustain that the next French White Paper will include terrorism such as one of 
the most prominent security challenge for the French national security along the long term security 
related issue including international relationships (above all the Middle East relationship) and 
European or bilateral relationships.  
Natural hazards 
Natural hazards and other related challenges have only recently become prominent, however it is 
clearly understood that this is an issue the government will face in the nearest future.  
Considering the French evolution of public policies addressing natural hazards, they do take into 
account such as a long term security related issues, although the major focus of French national 
policies is on the economic losses, business interruption and property damages. French authorities 
are interested in the possibility to extend the current insurance also for natural hazards or perils.49 
This approach aligns the evolution of the French policies on natural hazards, their prevention and 
management: “the system introduced by the Act of 13 July 1982 for the indemnification of natural 
catastrophe combines the solidarity inherent to mutualisation (the basis of the institution of 
insurance) in relation to a given risk and through payment of a premium with the principle of national 
solidarity via the guarantee granted by the State.” 50 This principle is a key point also for the 
operative management of an emergency. In recent years, there has been an improvement in 
technology used in crisis management and emergency response along the continuing attention to the 
insurance aspects and the involvement of solidarity principles aimed at crisis response.   
Finally the key feature of French policies on natural hazards management is the attention paid on 
insurance and the economic effects caused by natural hazards: this point is completely 
                                                          
46http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc
_sur_defense_875/index.html 
47 http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/134000257.pdf  
48 Page 96 http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/134000257.pdf  
49 II World Forum on Catastrophes Programmes, 17th of September 2007, Madrid  
50 Caisse Centrale de Reassurance (CCR), Les catastrophe naturelles en France. Avril 2007 www.ccr.fr  
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understandable considering the importance of the business continuity for the national critical 
infrastructure and the importance of the national energy supply chain.  
Social instability  
French social instability and its related issues of welfare State and social protection have been a key 
point for the French national policies since the post II World War. According to the documents coded 
and the desk research conducted, the evolution of the French social protection system has the 
following key features: 
- it is influenced by the national structures and events that impact on the population; 
- it is deeply rooted in a cultural perception of public services provided by the State as well as 
other services provided by the private sector. This is also an essential characteristic of France 
that it is possible to notice on a multiple perspectives (mixed economy; mixed natural 
hazards management system; mixed social protection system); 
- in France the attention to the social protection, social service and health care system has 
always been a prominent issue for the national Parliament and national Government In this 
context it is possible to find again the gap identified before within the framework of 
terroristic policies; 
- the current political debates and the national trend in the last ten years have been affected 
by social phenomenon such as social disorder, immigration waves and local criminality.  
Specifically, the French case study shows that another major security challenge is social instability 
related to the social disorder51 occurred in 2005 in Paris (banlieue in Paris), criminality52 (as well as 
local criminality), issues related to the immigration53, and the economic crisis in 2008 with its impact 
on the social protection and health care system. Migrants are seen as a security challenge because 
they are perceived to be ‘as opponents of the home regime’, ‘as a political risk to the host country’, 
‘as a threat to cultural identity’, ‘as a social or economic burden’ and ‘as hostages, risks for the 
sending country’. 
In particular, the security issues linked to the immigration process in France have played a key role in 
the election campaign for the French political election in 2015.   
 
2.2.4. Overview of current trends  
A general overview of the security challenges makes clear that, at a national level, the security 
challenges and the related core values are perceived to be long term: particular attention is paid to 
terrorist attacks and the long term of fighting against these specific security challenges. This is clearly 
demonstrated in the most important French document on National Security Strategy, “French White 
Paper: Defence and National Security”54, released in 201355, with which the identified security 
challenges are aligned.   
The White Paper states the basis of French strategy on security and defense issues. Specifically, it 
turns its attention on national security (physical safety and security); international alliances and 
                                                          
51 Senat 28th August 2013, Question orale sans débat n° 0646S de M. Christian Favier, Besoins de sécurité de la population 
du Val-de-Marne.  
52 Senat 22th November 2013, Question crible thématique n° 0166C de M. Jean-Patrick Courtois (Saône-et-Loire - UMP), La 
sécurité : les chiffres de la délinquance.  
53 Senat, Question d'actualité au gouvernement n° 0375G de Mme Marie-Christine Blandin(Nord - ECOLO), 18 July 2014  
54 François Hollande President of the French Republic, French White Paper, Defence and National Security, 2013 edition  
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conflicts and the role of France within European boundaries (political instability and security); the 
fight against criminal and illicit factions (social security and stability); environmental protection 
(environmental security and protection); security industry (economic prosperity and security) and 
terrorism. Whilst the White Paper does not pay much attention to natural hazards and 
environmental risk assessment, these themes are well considered in other related national 
documents and in the European and International policy documents for natural hazards and disasters 
matters.  
The White Paper has been written by the national government (and the specific committees for each 
sub-theme). In line with the coding process, that the national security strategy document tallies with 
the core values such as physical security and political stability of the national government and 
newspapers, but it doesn’t represent public opinion and the core values of social security and 
economic prosperity well. For instance the core value of political stability is based on the 
international alliances between France and other nations, and it is not covered by all sources but only 
international agencies and national institutions. The analysis identifies a gap between the general 
public and the institutional agencies which are aimed at responding to the specific security 
challenges.   
In this context, and considering the core values and their distribution and presence among the 
sources and the focus of the White Paper, it is possible to state that some of them change their 
influence due to the different sources and research activities considered. The history and trends of 
the French security as influenced by a double view. On the one hand there is the preponderance of 
the history of social securité after the Second World War and the foundation of a sort of Welfare 
State, while on the other hand it takes into account the French security in term of national security 
and national defence. This double perspective continues to be the most predominant vision of the 
current French security and sécurité debates.   
The following security perception pathways can be identified:  
1. As stated before, coding analysis highlights that the main core values are those related to 
physical safety and security as well as those related to political instability, social security 
and economic prosperity. In particular, these last two core values are considered deeply 
interconnected due to the domino effects caused by the economic crisis and its influence 
on social and health care systems. On the contrary, considering the desk research and 
the historical evolution, it is possible to define two valuable pathways that also seem to 
be salient for the near future. The first considers the security challenges and security 
perception related to physical safety and environmental protection: France is a European 
country where many extreme weather conditions as well as floods or heat waves have 
frequently taken place. So, in this context it is also important understand the security 
challenges that have occurred and the levels of risk prevention activities.  
2. The second takes into account the terrorist attacks by Islamic groups or individuals that 
occurred in the last ten years in France and these seem to be the most important security 
challenges for France and French citizens.  
Terrorist threats have become the main security issue in a country like France, defined by many 
different agencies as one of the most relevant European countries under terrorist attack. Considering 
this background, it is possible to understand the interconnection between the most prominent core 
values – physical safety and social order or local crime related issues.  
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The comparison between coding results and its core values, and desk research and its value provides 
an interesting turning point in the midst of security perception and identification of security 
challenges for France. The findings can be summed up according to the Tables 3 and 4, considering 
their presence in the two different research analyses:  
Table 3 Core Values explicit or latent according to the two different research analyses  
Core Values  Coding Analysis Desk Research Analysis 
(Historical Trajectory) 
Physical safety and security Explicit Explicit 
Political instability Explicit Latent  
Social security and economic 
prosperity  
Explicit  Latent  
 
Table 4 The most salient security challenges explicit or latent according to the different research analysis 
The most salient security 
challenges 
Coding 
Analysis 
Desk Research Analysis  (Historical 
Trajectory) 
Terrorist attacks 
(including cyber- attacks) 
Explicit Explicit 
Social stability and 
protection (including 
health care system) 
Explicit Explicit 
Flooding  Explicit Explicit 
Climate change Explicit Both explicit and latent (the focus is 
on the effects of climate change) 
Illegal immigration Explicit Explicit 
 
Two significant trends in the discourse on risk and security perception in France emerge as a result of 
the analysis of the coding results and secondary sources. The first trend is the multidimensional 
feature of that security concept that does not allow a clear identification of a specific core value. 
What can be considered are the main core values that are represented by the security challenges and 
the sources identified. The second trend concerns the two distinct forms of core values such as 
explicit or latent. The analysis conducted means “explicit” when the core value is explicitly 
considered in the sources analysed, or is specifically addressed by the different agencies that are in 
charge of an effective response to the security challenge observed. On the contrary the analysis 
marks the core value as “latent”, when the core value is a secondary belief or effect of the main core 
value, or is completely absent in the sources analysed. Interestingly, the comparison between coding 
results and secondary data, including the White Paper, exposes a gap in the representation and 
consideration of social security and economic prosperity: this core value is one of the most 
prominent core values whereas the White Paper and similar documents give a minor role in the 
general overview and historical trajectory of France’s security perception. Similarly, regional and 
local levels are absent in the discussion on the security issues in the secondary sources, while the 
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coding analysis states that regional and local levels play an important role in addressing security 
issues, concerning the core values of social stability and economic prosperity.  
In terms of the saliency of the most prominent security challenges, the following can be stated: 
- Terrorist attacks remain a salient core value that has to be addressed by institutional and 
international agencies in the near future. This security challenge is incorporated into the core 
value of physical security as well as political instability (also at an international level and 
considering international alliances or conflicts) and social security. It also seems to be 
connected to the general economic crisis that hit European countries and the world in the 
latest eight years.  
- Environmental and natural hazards due to the geography and the territory of France remain 
fundamental security challenges to be addressed by national, regional and local agencies. 
The core values related to this security challenge are environmental protection and security 
and physical security.  
- Social instability: has to be considered a prominent security challenge that needs to be 
addressed by National government, National parliament, private sector and third sector.  
According to the current analysis, it can jeopardize the national stability, the social security 
and even the social roots of France based on the universal principles of freedom, justice and 
solidarity. It is particularly hazardous due to its transversal nature aimed at covering many 
aspects of human life such as human rights, workplace, household economic well - being.  
 
Taking this analysis into account, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
- There is a difference among the core values considered in the coding analysis and those 
recognised in the French White Paper and related documents. In particular just one of the 
core values (physical safety and security) seems to be the most prominent in the policy 
documents, while the others play a minor role in the current security discussion. The coding 
thus provided a wider representation of the security discourse among the actors whose 
opinion may not necessarily be considered in the government documents.  
- The levels of the coding considered diverse levels such as global, international, regional, 
national, and local, while the French White Paper shows quite a unique attention to the 
national perspective and international relationships.   
- The sources and actors considered in the coding analysis are underestimated in terms of 
their roles within security matters and discussions as well as their competences to address 
security issues. For instance, actors such as general public and media are not well considered 
is a security discourse despite their roles in being affected by and addressing the security 
challenges. Such lack of involvement is due to the legal framework, but is also rooted in the 
cultural tradition that considers experts and operative professionals more trustworthy than 
ordinary people in order to address and manage security issues and their effects on public 
and social order.  
- The security challenges and core values are differently represented at different levels and by 
different sources: it can be stated that coding analysis show a more heterogeneous vision on 
the security perception and its core values, while the French White Paper has a predominant 
view at the national level, even if it includes the local level for training activities and to 
reinforce military and civilian defense. Furthermore, it is more focused on the operative 
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actions to do in order to assure national security such as protection, deterrence, 
intervention, knowledge and anticipation, prevention showing also the armed forces model.  
- Whilst the analysis of the coding documents and the policy publications demonstrated a 
clear trend that offers a general overview on the topic of security and risk perception, it is 
important to consider that all the security challenges discussed are interrelated due to their 
multidimensionality and inner complexity.  
 
2.4 Netherlands 
2.4.1 Characterisation of the core values  
Of the 430 publications coded, the three most prominent core values (Figure 3) for the Netherlands 
are: 
- Physical safety and security;  
- Economic prosperity and security; 
- Social stability and security.  
 
Figure 3 Security core values in the Netherlands 
Perceptions of security in the Netherlands are dominated by classical notions of physical security, this 
being the top core value for largest number of mentions in every source analysed except NGOs and 
private sector, where it came second to economic security. Newspapers were heavily focused on 
physical security in 2014, with the majority of articles on security mentioning at least one of those 
core values. In second place is economic security, the most mentioned core value by NGOs and the 
private sector and the second-most mentioned in government policy documents. In third position is 
social stability and security, addressed mainly by newspapers and parliamentary publications. 
Standing out as the main security challenges are: immigration related policies, local criminal 
activities, drug abuse and drug smuggling, and radicalisation of youth.  
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Most security challenges affect multiple core values. For example, information and cyber security is 
affected by cyber-crime, but cyber-crime also affects economic prosperity and security, and cyber-
attacks or disruptions have the potential to affect the physical dimension of security, when critical 
infrastructure is affected. From the coding exercise, two broad themes consisting of a cluster of 
challenges emerged to be most salient across different discourses:  
- Instability and Terrorism (including international crises, integration, radicalisation and 
polarisation); and 
- Cyber security challenges (including cyber-crime, cyber-attacks and cyber vulnerabilities). 
Other prominent security challenges include climate change and natural hazards, economic threats, 
man-made disasters such as nuclear and chemical accidents, energy and electricity, food security and 
epidemics and diseases (with particular attention to the recent Ebola epidemics in West Africa). All of 
these concerns are addressed by all sources (although to different extents). NGO publications for 
example are more concerned about climate change and food security, while man-made disasters and 
economic threats (i.e. fraud, tax evasions etc.) are mainly talked about in private sector publications. 
Parliamentary publications draw attention to immigration related concerns, such as the lack of 
immigrant integration and issues related to refugees and asylum seekers in the Netherlands. In the 
case of government policy documents, the majority of security challenges identified concern physical 
security, words such as ‘violence’, ‘accidents’, ‘burglary’, ‘influenza’, ‘fires’, and weather-related 
threats featuring particularly prominently. Also salient were words which could relate to economic 
security such as ‘theft’, and ‘supply’. 
 
2.4.2. Description of the security challenges 56 
Actors: The two most prominent actors in security discourses in the Netherlands are the national 
parliament and the national government. The public is perceived as the main object of security 
challenges followed by the private sector.  Within physical safety and security, the most salient 
security challenge is terrorism, which is addressed by all actors to various degrees. The media for 
example pay overwhelming attention to terrorism and conflict with particular emphasis on the 
Ukraine crisis and the conflicts in the Middle East, all of which are perceived to have a direct or 
indirect effect on Dutch national security. Government publications appear to have a more balanced 
take on a broader range of security challenges; ranging from domestic issues such as low level 
violence, burglary and traffic accident; natural hazards such as storms and floods; to international 
tensions in Ukraine and the Middle East; thus signaling the government preoccupation with all 
aspects of physical security. In stark contrast, academic and NGO publications pay little to no 
attention to terrorism. NGO focus primarily on environmental and ecological issues, while academia 
shows more concern for social stability, as evidenced by its focus on immigrant related concerns. The 
analysis also shows that government, academia, and the private sector focus overwhelmingly on 
themselves as the actors called upon to tackle security issues. Government documents generally call 
on one of the arms of national or local government, with a small role left for the private sector and 
no mention of academia. Academia made no attempt to address the government or the private 
sector in the security challenges it identified. The private sector did mention the other two sectors as 
salient addressees to tackle security challenges—especially government—but still addressed itself in 
over half the cases. When analysing who the ‘object’ of security challenges are, particularly striking is 
                                                          
56 See appendix E for the visual representation of the data 
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newspapers’ heavy focus on the general public—though perhaps unsurprising given the need to 
engage their readership. The private sector generally refers to itself as the main object of security 
challenges. While actors tend to very much focus on themselves in their own documents, prominent 
attention is given to the private sector in government policy documents; to government and private 
sector in academic publications; and to government in private sector documents. Concerns about 
economic prosperity and security are primarily addressed by the government and the private sector. 
Of particular significance here are issues pertaining to cyber-crime, which receive overwhelming 
attention from the government and the private sector. No doubt this is reflective of the need for 
both the private sector and the government to address cyber related challenges, but it also reveals a 
lack of awareness from the part of other actors, albeit that if the NCTV Barometers are any measure, 
this is set to change.57  
Levels: Overall, security challenges are discussed at the national and international level, while the 
transnational level account for very little; and the global level is almost non-existent. There are 
however marked differences in regards to the emphasis placed on each level. Within government 
policy documents the levels mentioned in relation to physical and territorial security are 
overwhelmingly domestic, with local, provincial, and national discussions accounting for the 
overwhelming majority of the discourse analysed even if some strategies also touch on the 
international, transnational and global level. The private sector places more emphasis on the national 
and international levels, with very little focus on the local, global and transnational levels. 
Parliamentary publications appear more balanced, except for the global level, which receives seldom 
mention. Newspapers appeared more mixed. Although domestic events still accounted for the 
majority of references to physical and territorial security, international affairs played a much more 
salient role. Considering the main levels and the respective core values considered by all actors based 
on all sources of the Dutch security discourse, the main focus of the Dutch security discourse lies at 
the national level. Terrorism and cyber related issues are mainly discussed on the national and 
international level. Discussions on the global level are almost non-existent across all actors, with the 
exception of the government and the private sector. NGO publications pay no attention to cyber 
related issues, and only slightly touch upon terrorism on the local, national and international levels. 
Government and parliament publications discuss both terrorism and cyber issues on all levels 
(although the global level account for very little for government, and is non-existent for 
parliamentary publications). The private sector only focuses on the national and international levels 
when discussing cyber related issues.  
Sources: The Dutch national security strategy itself gives prime and equal consideration to territorial, 
physical, economic, ecological security, and social and political stability.58 This comprehensive view is 
complemented by a focus on information and cyber security in other documents.59 There are noted 
                                                          
57Ipsos, “NCTV Ipsos Risico- En Crisisbarometer: Basismeting Juni 2014” (Amsterdam: Ipsos, March 7, 2014), 
https://www.nctv.nl/Images/risico-en-crisisbarometer-basismeting-juni-2014_tcm126-558869.pdf. 
58 Rijksoverheid, Strategie Nationale Veiligheid, 2007, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-
publicaties/brochures/2010/06/25/strategie-nationale-veiligheid/factsheet-strategie-nationale-veiligheid.pdf.  For annual 
progress reports, see Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, “Documenten Strategie Nationale Veiligheid | Nationaal 
Cordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid,” webpagina, (November 10, 2014), 
https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/nv/strategie-nationale-veiligheid/documenten-snv/.   
59 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Nationale Cyber Security Strategie - Rapport - Rijksoverheid.nl, rapport, (February 
28, 2011), available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/ rapporten/2011/02/28/nationale-cyber-
security-strategie.html.; Nationale Cyber Security Strategie 2 (October 28, 2013), available at 
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variations regarding the extent to which each source addresses specific security challenges. 
Terrorism for example is addressed across all sources, particularly by newspapers, while the private 
sector and the government almost exclusively address cyber security. Newspapers focus 
predominantly on ’classic’ core values of physical and territorial security. Yet it is Dutch academia 
which is the most balanced in its focus on different core values, addressing the topics in almost equal 
proportions. Concerns about cyber security receive much more attention from government and the 
private sector, but less attention in the media. Economic security receives relatively more 
attention—in particular from the private sector— than some other issues such as identity and 
environmental issues. Finally, the attention given to territorial security is striking, no doubt induced 
by the war in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, the conflicts in the Middle East. 
Human rights and ethical issues: In Dutch media discourse, terrorism was predominantly discussed 
as a threat to national security rather than a human rights issue. Also when it comes to terrorism, 
ethical issues receive considerable attention in government and parliamentary discourse. NGO 
publications drew attention to basic human right issues, including children's right, freedom of 
speech, access to health and labour rights. Private sector publications on the other hand focus on 
information privacy, including the safeguarding of private data and the need to ensure that 
companies operate within acceptable ethical standards. In parliamentary debates there is reflection 
on the tension between the protection of basic constitutional rights of citizens and the need to 
protect physical security from terrorist attacks, specifically in light of the risk posed by returning 
foreign fighters. Where it comes to external policies to dealing with terrorism, ethical issues receive 
considerable attention in government and parliamentary discourse. Debates between government 
and parliament about foreign military interventions always involve arguments relating to 
international law, promotion of human rights and gender aspects.60 Upholding international law is by 
Dutch constitution one of the core tasks of the armed forces.61 Promoting the international legal 
order and strengthening and spreading the rule of law in fragile societies are identified as a core 
Dutch priority in the Dutch international security strategy.62 In the cyber domain, privacy protection 
is flagged as one of the priorities in the national cyber strategy, even if the discussion about the 
appropriate scope of discretionary authority of security services in the cyber domain remains 
debated, both by parliament, government, the media and NGOs.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2013/10/28/nationale-cyber-security-strategie-2.html; 
AIVD Annual Report (The Hague, April 23, 2014), available at https://www.aivd.nl/publicaties/aivd-
publicaties/@3251/annual-report-2014/  
60 See also Sweijs T. (2009) at http://www.hcss.nl/reports/dutch-military-intervention-decision-making-revisited-getting-a-
constitutional-grip-on-21st-century-wars/28/ for an overview of the various criteria involved in Dutch military intervention 
decision making procedures.  
61 According to Article 97 of the Dutch Constitution: ‘There shall be armed forces for the defence and protection of the 
interests of the Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the international legal order.’ 
(http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/9353000/1/j9vvihlf299q0sr/vgrndb9f5vzi, last accessed 13 May 2015,)  
62 A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World – International Security Strategy (June 21, 2013). Available at 
http://www.government.nl/ documents-and-publications/notes/2013/06/21/internationalsecurity-strategy.html; 
Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid – Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving, November 14, 2014. Available at 
http:// www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/ kamerstukken/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-
veiligheidturbulente-tijden-in-een-instabiele-omgeving.html 48 
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2.4.3. Historical trajectory 
Terrorism  
In the 1970s multiple terrorist attacks perpetrated by discontented South Moluccans -- who felt 
thwarted by the Dutch government in realising their ambition for an independent state - prompted 
the Dutch government to first develop policies to address the risk posed by terrorism. But it was not 
until the attacks of 9/11 that terrorism again returned to the forefront of Dutch policy makers’ 
attention. At the national level, the killings of prominent politician Pim Fortuyn by an environmental 
extremist in 2002 and film director and publicist Theo van Gogh by a jihadist extremist in 2004, 
prompted terrorism to receive even greater policy priority, so did the detection of the Hofstad group, 
a small group of radicalised Muslim extremists. At the international level, the 11-3-2004 bombings in 
Madrid and the 7/7 London attacks also had a sizeable impact on the counter terrorism discourse. 
Soon after the events of 9/11 – in October 2001 - the Dutch government announced its Action Plan 
Counterterrorism and Security (‘Actieplan Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid’). It introduced a 
number of policy initiatives in rapid succession, including a swift reaction terrorism warning system 
(‘Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding’) for public and private actors, as well as the creation of a 
collaborative information sharing centre of different public bodies, later duped the CT Infobox. The 
Action plan also included the allocation of greater funds for existing capabilities of security services 
and law enforcement agencies.63 2004 marked the establishment of the Office of the National 
Coordinator for Counter Terrorism (NCTB) to coordinate all counter terrorism activities, and the 
introduction of a national periodical Terrorism Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN). The Dutch 
counterterrorism approach is by the Dutch government’s own admission characterised as ‘broad’: it 
focuses both on repression and early stage prevention. The approach was first described in the 2003 
letter to parliament Terrorism and the protection of society (‘Terrorismebestrijding en bescherming 
van de samenleving’). Early stage prevention was then further formalised in 2007 in the action plan 
Polarisation and Radicalisation (‘Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2007-2011’).64 The four pillars pronged 
EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism was launched in 2005 
focusing on prevent, protect, pursue and respond. During that same period, the government 
expanded its discretionary authority by adopting and adapting various laws including the Law on 
terrorist crimes  (‘Wet terroristische misdrijven’) in 2004 and the Law on expanding the possibilities 
to detect and prosecute terrorist crimes (‘Wet ter verruiming vande mogelijkheden tot opsporing en 
vervolging van terroristische misdrijven’) in 2006.65 The government also initiated and intensified a 
number of programs in the field of counter terrorism finance and counter CBRN-proliferation. It also 
significantly expanded the capacity of the Dutch intelligence services in 2005. Dutch armed forces 
were deployed to Afghanistan; combating ‘international terrorism’ being cited by the government as 
one of the primary reasons to do so.66 
                                                          
63 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, “Antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland in  het eerste decennium van  de 21e 
eeuw Over totstandkoming, toepassing, beoordeling en aanpassing van antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland 2001 – 
2010” (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, January 28, 2011), 37, 
https://www.nctv.nl/actueel/persberichten/nederlands-terrorismebeleid-degelijkvormgegeven.aspx. 
64 Ibid, 41-42 
65 Ibid. 
66 B.R. Bot, H.G.J. Kamp, and A.M.A. van ArdenneVan der Hoeven, Kamerbrief 22 December 2005: Nederlandsebijdrage aan 
ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan 22 december 2005 (The Hague: Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development 
cooperation, 2005)  
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The rise of the right wing anti-Muslim political party spearheaded by Geert Wilders, and the showing 
of his anti-Muslim film Fitna in 2008, created considerable controversy, both in the Netherlands and 
abroad. It prompted the NCTB to raise the terrorism risk from limited to substantial.67But already in 
2009 the Dutch government asserted that ‘the group of radicals that is willing to resort to violence to 
achieve political or religious goals has diminished in size, while there is a greater understanding of 
the operations of this group.68 In 2011 the Dutch government launched its first comprehensive 
counter terrorism strategy (CTS). The CTS specifically emphasises that it is neither intended as a call 
to arms in a ‘war on terrorism’, nor as a struggle against specific religious minorities, nor as a Dutch 
contribution to a ‘clash of civilisations’.69 It continues to assert that combating terrorism should 
always take place within the boundaries of the rule of law while respecting the fundamental 
freedoms of citizens. It then outlines five pillars and eight strategic priorities. The five pillars of the 
‘broad approach’ cover the entire spectrum of counterterrorism and consist of: 
• Information gathering: intelligence collection and threat assessments 
• Prevent: early interventions to prevent radicalisation and terrorist acts 
• Defend: defend Dutch society against concrete terrorist threats 
• Prepare: Prepare for the impact of a terrorist attack  
• Prosecute: identify, prosecute, and bring to justice of persons suspected of being involved (in 
the preparation of) terrorist activities70. 
 
The strategy also lays down the following eight strategic priorities where the Dutch government will 
focus its efforts on: 
• Jihadist battlefield 
• Jihadist discourse and propaganda 
• Migration and travel movement   
• Technology and innovation 
• Internet   
• CBRN/E   
• Radicalised lone wolves   
• Security awareness and performance71 
Since 2009 the salience of the terrorism risk has evolved once again. Ongoing conflicts in the Middle 
East have precipitated the ‘resurgence of holy violence.72 In 2013, the General Intelligence and 
Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) warned that Dutch radical Islamist movements play an 
active role in promoting the jihad in Syria among Dutch Muslims. Young people leaving the 
Netherlands to join the war against Syrian president Assad may return traumatized and possibly as 
                                                          
67 See Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, “Actueel dreigingsniveau | Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en 
Veiligheid,” webpagina, (April 7, 2015), https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/tb/dtn/actueeldreigingsniveau/.  
68 As cited in Justitie, “Antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland in  het eerste decennium van  de 21e eeuw Over 
totstandkoming, toepassing, beoordeling en aanpassing van antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland 2001 – 2010,” 47. 
69 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, “Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015 gepresenteerd - Persbericht - 
Rijksoverheid.nl,” persbericht, (April 19, 2011),22, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en 
publicaties/persberichten/2011/04/19/nationale-contraterrorismestrategie-2011-2015-gepresenteerd.html. 
70 Ibid., 38.  
71 Ibid., 42.  
72 Tim Sweijs, Jasper Ginn, and Stephan De Spiegeleire, “Barbarism and Religion: The Resurgence of Holy Violence,” in 
Strategic Monitor 2015 (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015). 
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radicalized Islamists, as regularly reported in various media outlets.73 The annual report of the Dutch 
General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD in its most recent issue focuses on the dangers 
emanating from Syria, on cyber-espionage and on how the modes of operation of the intelligence 
services need to be reviewed and/or reformed in the wake of the Snowden revelations.74 In short, 
the risk of religiously inspired terrorism therefore features once again prominently on the Dutch 
security agenda.  
Cyber-crime 
In the flurry of cybersecurity strategies published by EU member states in 2011, the first Dutch 
National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCSS1) was presented as one of the first in February of that year. 
Now a commonly used name, it was the first significant emergence of the broader concept of cyber 
and cyber security in an official policy document in the Netherlands.75 
The purpose of the NCSS1 was to realise a secure, reliable and resilient digital domain through an 
integral cyber security approach based on public-private partnerships, as well as to seize the ensuing 
opportunities for society. The strategy of 2011 emphasized the importance of Information and 
communications technology (ICT) for the Dutch economy and protection against all sorts of 
disruption was considered very much from this economic perspective. This particular angle cannot be 
considered surprising as the historical responsibility of ICT up to that time had a significant business 
continuity element and the topic itself was the responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. As 
such, the policy debate in the first decade of this century was primarily dominated by economic and 
technology issues related to information- and communication systems and information security. 
Opportunities of ICT systems and their role in stimulating economic and sustainable growth as well as 
facilitating the interaction between government and citizen (eGovernment) were the key focus of the 
various ICT agendas that the Dutch central government had published since 2004.76 Security and ICT 
as a concept was seen as instrumental – providing security solutions by using ICT – or as a reliability 
issue – having accessibility to ICT networks and services, and being able to protect the integrity and 
content of information.  During that time, there were other initiatives related to cyber security. The 
protection of government information distribution systems (intragovernment as well as G2C), the 
inclusion of cybercrime into a comprehensive approach for crime prevention, and the development 
of a structure of critical infrastructure sectors and systems in the Netherlands were gradually 
increasing the security dimension of Dutch cyberpolicy. 
Several developments towards 2010, led to a stronger shift in the policy response on cyber. The 
publication of the National Security Strategy in 2007 was the Dutch first comprehensive response to 
the changing security environment after the events of 9/11 in 2001. Digital insecurity was considered 
to be one of the sixteen themes that would require a more holistic approach, next to such risks as 
radicalisation, flooding, CBRN. This was expressed in the development of scenarios on cyberattacks, 
                                                          
73 See for example, Nieuwsuur,‘AIVD Waarschuwt Voor Jihadgangers,’ February 2013, 
http://nieuwsuur.nl/onderwerp/471454-aivd- waarschuwt-voor-jihadgangers.html.  
74 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, “Annual Report 2014”, (The Hague, April 2015), available at 
https://www.aivd.nl/english/publications-press/@3251/annual-report-2014/.  
75 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie,  “Nationale Cyber Security Strategie (NCSS1): Slagkracht door samenwerking”, (The 
Hague, June 2011), available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/02/22/nationale-
cyber-security-strategie-slagkracht-door-samenwerking.html     
76 See for example, Tweede Kamer, “De Rijksbrede ICT-agenda: Beter Presteren Met ICT, Kamerstuk 2003-2004, 26643, nr. 
47”, (The Hague, February 2004), and Tweede Kamer, “ICT-Agenda 2008-2011: De Gebruiker Centraal In de Digitale 
Dienstenmaatschappij, Kamerstuk 2007-2008, 26643, nr. 125, (The Hague, June 2008) 
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cyberespionage, and cyber conflict which were assessed by their likelihood and impact in the Dutch 
National Risk Assessment. Also, the decision to consolidate the Security department of the Ministry 
of Home Affairs with the Ministry of Justice into a Ministry of Security and Justice in 2010 reflected a 
significant upgrade of the position of security in the policy debate in the Netherlands. As stated, the 
publication of the NCSS1 in 2011 became paramount of the shift from predominantly safeguarding 
the economic dimension in cyber toward a strong presence of a secure cyberspace overall. It was the 
Minister of Security and Justice that officially presented the NCSS1 to Parliament. 
Following suit, the defence cyber security strategy was rolled out in 2012.77 This strategy focused on 
the following issues: 
• Attracting cyber professionals to defence 
• Intensifying cooperation in national and international context 
• Strengthening the knowledge base and the innovative capacity of defense in the digital 
domain 
• Creating a comprehensive  approach Strengthening the resilience of digital defence 
• Strengthening the intelligence position in the digital domain 
• Developing the military power to carry out cyber operations 
A sign of the relatively transparent discussion about cybersecurity was the announced ambition to be 
able to develop and deploy cyber offensive capabilities for the Dutch armed forces, an ambition that 
only the United States has explicitly announced, despite the fact that many more countries are 
actually developing offensive cyber.  
As the cyber domain is characterized by rapid changes, in October 2013, the Dutch government 
released a new cyber security strategy, NCSS2.78  The general approach of the NCSS2 is to seek to 
broaden the use of cyber communication in the Netherlands, and promote safe use of internet 
services in an approach that acknowledges the need for public-private cooperation. Amongst the key 
priorities identified are the creation of resilient cyber systems that promote societal growth, 
safeguard security and protect freedom.79 
The new strategy highlights the fact that the understanding of cyber threats has increased in the past 
years and that priority is now given to taking measures to adequately respond to these security 
challenges and the changes in the cyber domain. One of such measures is intensified collaboration 
between public and private actors through networks and strategic coalitions, both nationally and 
internationally. The NCSS2 also marks a shift from a generic to a risk-based approach, which seeks to 
find the right balance between the protection of interests against threats, and the level of risk that is 
acceptable to Dutch citizens. This shift fits the broader transition in Dutch security policy from a 
normative to a more interest-based approach. 
                                                          
77 It was updated in February 2015 
78 Ministry of Justice and Security, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2 (NCSS2): From Awareness to capability”, (The Hague, 
October 2013 ), available at https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/national-cyber-security-strategy.html. 
79 Willem Oosterveld, Tim Sweijs, Sijbren de Jong, and Joshua Polchar, “The Value of Cooperation: Innovation in Dutch 
Security Perspective”, (The Hague: The Hague Security Delta, 2015).available at 
https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/images/The_Value_of_Cooperation.pdf   
  
 
© EvoCS Consortium 35 For public release 
EvoCS Deliverable 7.1 
Report on the NW Europe Case Study Workshop 
Based on this strategy, the Dutch subsequently also developed two national cyber security research 
agendas, NCSRA I and II.80 The agenda contains two topics: ‘Security and Trust of Citizens’81 and 
‘Security and Trustworthiness of Infrastructure’.82 One of its objectives is to ‘strengthen research and 
analysis capabilities to gain more insight into threats and risks in the digital domain.’83 It stresses the 
importance of a multi-stakeholder approach, with public-private partnerships, where relevant 
cooperating internationally. Specifically, it highlights the value of a multidisciplinary approach, ‘in 
which the non-technical sub-areas are also included and needed to promote cybersecurity 
innovation.’84 
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) issues annual overviews called the Cyber security report, 
the 4th edition of which was released in July 2014. In this report, the NCSC drew attention to key 
findings such as the fact that the threat of disruptions as a result of dependence on cyber technology 
is still increasing; that this is partly the result of developments such as the ‘internet of things’, 
whereby ever more devices are being linked up to the internet; that the largest threats emanate 
from states and cybercriminals and that privacy is coming under pressure due to data-gathering and 
storage trends.85  
All in all, The Netherlands has a relatively well structured approach toward cybersecurity in Europe 
and the rest of the world, at least on paper. An overall national cybersecurity strategy which is used 
to guide both public and private sector initiatives is being kept up to date in an environment which is 
very dynamic. Based on its principles, a cybersecurity research agenda aims at developing research 
excellence in the cyber domain as well as developing solutions to the challenges faced by 
governments, businesses, and citizens alike.  
 
2.3.4. Overview of current trends 
The National Security Strategy (Strategie Nationale Veiligheid, SNV) catalogues various risks and 
provides guidelines to help prepare the Netherlands for different types of crisis. It approaches 
national security from the point of view of vital interests. These are: 1) territorial security, 2) 
economic security, 3) environmental security, 4) physical security, and 5) social and political 
stability.86  National security is threatened when at least one of these five vital interests is affected to 
such a degree that there is potential societal disruption. The strategy describes a process which 
consists of annual risk assessments, based on strategic surveys, risk scenarios and capacity 
assessments. It is updated annually by so-called progress reports to Parliament. The latest progress 
report87 outlined where capacity could and should be improved: cooperation in crisis management, 
                                                          
80 See https://www.nctv.nl/actueel/nieuws/cyber-security-research-agenda-investering-in-veiligheid-en-economische-
groei.aspx.   
81 This “includes privacy protection, security of mobile services, data and policy management, and accountability”. 
82 Which “includes malware detection and removal, intrusion detection and prevention, trustworthiness of networks and 
hardware, software security, security of SCADA/industrial control systems (ICS), and secure operating systems”. 
83 Ministry of Justice and Security, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2 (NCSS2): From Awareness to capability”, (The Hague, 
October 2013 ), p. 27, available at https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/national-cyber-security-strategy.html.  
84 Ibid., p. 26. 
85 Ministry of Security and Justice, “Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 4 (CSAN4)”, (The Hague, October 2014 ), 
available at https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/news/cyber-securty-assessment-netherlands-4-cybercrime-and-
digital-espionage-remain-the-biggest-threat.html.  
86 Rijksoverheid, Strategie Nationale Veiligheid.   
87 For annual progress reports, see Justitie, “Documenten Strategie Nationale Veiligheid | Nationaal Cordinator 
Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.” 
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improving information positions, awareness and training, crisis communication and capacity 
development as such to be put on the international agenda. In addition, the report stressed the need 
to improve international cooperation in the area of cyber security. In May 2015, it was announced 
that the process will be further adapted with once every four years a broad overarching all hazard 
risk assessment complemented by quick risk and capacity assessments in the interval periods 
between.88  
Since the publication of the SNS in 2007, the international security environment has further evolved. 
These changes in the international environment are captured well by the International Security 
Strategy (ISS), which was published in June 2013 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ISS assesses 
the implications of recent developments in the international environment for the strategic interests 
of the Netherlands.89 The ISS stresses that, as an open economy, international developments have a 
direct or indirect impact on Dutch economic security. It emphasises the vulnerability of the 
Netherlands due to its import dependence of raw materials and energy.  
In November 2014, the government issued an addendum to the 2013 ISS, which highlighted fresh 
challenges such as Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. This letter 
also highlighted developments such as the Ebola crisis, the rise of new non-state actors and of China, 
as well as the increasing importance of cyber, and demographic and climatological trends.90 
Instability and terrorism as well as various cyber security challenges are singled out as priorities 
across these documents. Various annual risk assessments have considered the likelihood and impact 
of right wing -, left wing- and religious terrorism on Dutch national security. In that context, 
radicalisation of individuals and societal polarisation between groups were also assessed. Here the 
impact on social and political stability was deemed especially relevant. Although the likelihood and 
impact of such challenges were on average assessed to possess a medium probability (scale 1-5, 
score 3: ‘to some extent likely’) and medium impact score (scale 1-5, score 3: severe). Large scale 
societal polarisation was seen as a greater risk (probability: to some extent likely (3); impact: very 
severe (4)). Cyber espionage and cyber conflict scored significantly higher (probability: 
probable/highly probable (4/5) and impact: very severe (4)). Extended paralysis of the electricity 
network due to sabotage was likewise deemed to be a great risk (probability: to some extent 
probable (3) and impact: very severe (4)).91 In the policy documents that address dealing with many 
of these risks, solutions and capabilities at the national and at the local level are predominantly 
identified with only some attention to international and transnational forms of cooperation. 
One of the methodological constraints of the risk assessment approach used in the SNV is that is 
difficult to assess the magnitude of risk of international developments for Dutch national security 
                                                          
88 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, “Kamerbrief over voortgang nationale veiligheid - Kamerstuk - Rijksoverheid.nl,” 
kamerstuk, (May 13, 2015), http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2015/05/14/tk-
voortgangsbrief-nationale-veiligheid.html. 
89 A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World – International Security Strategy (June 21, 2013). Available at 
http://www.government.nl/ documents-and-publications/notes/2013/06/21/internationalsecurity-strategy.html; 
Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid – Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving, November 14, 2014. Available at 
http:// www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/ kamerstukken/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-
veiligheidturbulente-tijden-in-een-instabiele-omgeving.html 48  
90 Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid – Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving, November 14, 2014. Available at 
http:// www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/ kamerstukken/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-
veiligheid- turbulente-tijden-in-een-instabiele-omgeving.html 
91 Justitie, “Documenten Strategie Nationale Veiligheid | Nationaal Cordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.” 
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even if – in the words of the Dutch Foreign Ministry - ‘contemporary threats to our security 
transcend national borders and local barriers. Internal and external security have become 
inseparable’.92  
The international security strategy (ISS) complements the national security strategy and – in a longlist 
of priorities – identifies the risk of religiously inspired terrorism. It also explicitly recognises fragile 
states and ineffective and illegitimate governance as breeding and training grounds for new 
generations of terrorists. These may fight far away from Dutch shores but can also return to create 
havoc in the Netherlands. The tragic events on and after 17 July 2014, when flight MH17 was 
downed, show the risk of international instability to the physical security of Dutch citizens, so it is 
asserted in the update. It therefore calls for an internationalist and proactive posture in which 
prevention is a central element. Global and transnational solutions are propagated here.  
Cyber is also identified as an important theme in the international security strategy. Here the 
emphasis lies on the opportunities that rapid developments in the cyber domain will bring. It refers 
to the Global Conference on CyberSpace 2015 – held in April 2015 – which was hosted by the 
Netherlands and brought together a large coalition of countries. The cyber security strategy, the 
cyber trend reports issued by the National Cyber Security Centre and the annual report of the secret 
services, specifically flag cybercrime, cyber espionage and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure as 
key risks to economic security and prosperity as well as to physical security.93 In dealing with cyber 
risks, both the local, the national, the international and the transnational level are singled out to be 
appropriate levels of action.  
The government, parliamentary and media security discourses are surprisingly similar – allowing for 
differences in salience – where it concerns the perception of security challenges related to instability 
and terrorism, and cyber security. It is likely a reflection of a series of international security 
developments that have had sizeable effects on Dutch national security and on Dutch national 
security perceptions and discourses overall. These perceptions will likely develop and evolve further 
but at the moment they seem to follow similar tracks. Across different discourses the focus has been 
shifting from internal to external security challenges.  In addition to ‘profits’ and ‘principles’, ‘peace’ 
has once more become a salient theme.94 As a result, both in governmental, parliamentary and 
media security discourses, security challenges to physical safety and security and social stability and 
security (as well as territorial integrity) have now complemented (security) challenges to economic 
prosperity and human rights. 
Also across these security discourses, the levels of action to deal with security challenges include 
local, national, and international, but also the global and the transnational levels are relatively often 
mentioned. Government documents talk more about national and local solutions than popular media 
which is representative of a devolved institutional arrangement that favours production of a large 
amount of government literature focused on internal affairs, outweighing outward-looking discourse. 
Also, while the sample of coded government documents spans roughly a decade, the newspaper 
articles were only from the past year.  
                                                          
92 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, “A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World - News Item - Government.nl,” June 21, 
2013, http://www.government.nl/news/2013/06/21/a-secure-netherlands-in-a-secure-world.html. 
93 See sourced cited in fn. 59 as well as “Trendrapporten | NCSC,” accessed May 28, 2015, 
https://www.ncsc.nl/dienstverlening/expertise-advies/kennisdeling/trendrapporten. 
94 J. J. C. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy (M. Nijhoff, 1979).    
  
 
© EvoCS Consortium 38 For public release 
EvoCS Deliverable 7.1 
Report on the NW Europe Case Study Workshop 
Much emphasis in the Dutch security sector is placed on the importance of cooperation between 
different disciplines and fields. In particular, a so-called ‘triple helix’ combining government, 
business, and academia is held to be the gold standard of collaboration for optimal security 
outcomes.95 What the results of the coding also show, however, is the ostensible lack of dialogue 
between the three sectors of the triple helix in their respective publications: with some exceptions 
(i.e., cyber), each actor very much continues to feature predominantly both addressor and as 
addressee in its own publications. 
Current trends in Dutch security reflect to a large extent the themes identified in the previous 
sections. The prominent role of physical security and economic security, the focus on the 
interrelatedness of Dutch and international security agendas, and the cooperation between multiple 
sectors are all salient. Each of these trends is also closely interrelated. 
The main findings for the Netherlands include: 
- Security, in all its different guises, is more than ever back on the national policy agenda; 
- While the salience of security challenges varies across discourses and per thematic area, 
there are also remarkable overlaps; and 
- Recent events as well as the examination of the various thematic areas has shown that 
domestic and international security concerns are interlinked and cross-dimensional;  
- Core features of the Dutch security discourse are an emergent focus on physical security and 
economic security, a renewed international outlook, and increasingly concerned if not yet 
fully realised efforts to foster cooperation among the various sectors of Dutch society in the 
interests of security—but also of prosperity. The three can be seen as mutually 
interdependent since physical and economic security is dependent on global developments 
and on successful collaboration among actors within the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
95 http://www.hcss.nl/reports/the-value-of-cooperation-innovation-in-dutch-security-in-perspective/162 
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3. Regional analysis 
3.1 Characterisation of the predominant core values  
Overall, 1,386 publications in three case study countries were coded. The researchers have carried 
out an intercoder reliability exercise in order to ensure the consistency in coding: a reliability rate of 
86% was achieved. According to the coding results (Figure 4) physical safety and security is by far the 
most salient core value in the NWE region. Other salient core values are social stability and security 
(in particular in France, where the issue of immigration was very prominent), information and cyber 
security, and economic prosperity and security. The two latter core values are extremely intertwined, 
particularly when it comes to the context of cyber-crime. Cultural identity is not seen as a salient core 
value, however the trends in polarisation and radicalisation in the region are becoming more and 
more prominent, which may increase the saliency of this core value in the future. At the time of the 
coding exercise these trends were mostly related to social stability as well as physical safety and 
security, however this may change in the future.  
 
Figure 4 NWE region core values 
Based on the country profile discussions, physical safety and security and economic prosperity and 
security will be the focus of this analysis, as the former is the most salient core value and the second 
is the most intertwined core value.  
The most salient security challenges across the region are: 
- Terrorism (and the effect of national affairs on the national situation, issues of polarisation 
and radicalisation) ; and  
- Cyber security. 
Other security challenges that have been discussed in all three countries include immigration 
(including illegal immigration), natural hazards, climate change, and energy and food supply.  
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3.2 Description of the security challenges, political actors, levels, and ethics and human rights96  
Actors: A variety of actors is involved in the popular discourse of terrorism and cyber-crime. The 
most prominent addressor is all three case study countries is national government, with its role being 
particularly noticeable when it comes to addressing the issue of terrorism. In France the national 
government plays a lesser role as an addressor, and it is the only country where think tanks and 
international governments have quite a large say in matters of terrorism and cyber-crime threats. 
The role of private sector as an addressor increases dramatically in the context of the cyber-crime, 
which is not surprising as they are perceived to also be an object of this security challenge. EU does 
not act as an addressor in any of the countries, which can be attributed to the limitations of this 
coding exercise: only national rather than EU level documents (in which EU would probably be the 
main addressor) were coded.   
The actors which are addressed on the issues of terrorism and cyber-crime are also diverse. Again, 
national government plays the largest role as an addressee, however private sector – particularly in 
the case of cyber-crime - is also perceived to be an actor who should listen to what addressors have 
to say. Foreign government also acts as an addressee in the context of terrorism threats: this may be 
explained by the efforts of all three governments to find the root of the terrorism problem and 
reduce its impacts. Whilst being by far the largest object of terrorism and cyber-crime across the 
region, general public at the same time they play a very little role as addressors or addressee, and do 
not play any role at all in France. The coding results demonstrate that all the actors (except think 
tanks) are affected by the analysed security challenges to some extent. Interestingly, in the UK 
government is perceived to be the second largest object of both security challenges.  
Overall in the NWE region, national governments, private sector and parliament have the largest say 
and are the largest recipients of the information. This demonstrates that whilst mostly talking to 
themselves, governments are also trying to connect with private sector, which is a core of all the case 
study countries’ economies. At the same time there is very little contact with local and regional 
governments, which are in charge of implementing security-related policies on the ground.  Similarly, 
the general public who is perceived to be the largest object of security challenges is hardly being 
communicated to, thus it is unclear whether the general public should fully rely on governments’ 
decisions when it comes to security matters.  
Levels: Security discourse relevant to terrorism and cyber-crime is the most predominant at a 
national level in all case study countries. Terrorism is discussed at a national level in the UK and 
Netherlands, whereas France focuses more at an international level. Global level is not a part of the 
security discourse in the context of the analysed security challenges. Overall in the NWE region, a 
larger attention is paid to the threat of terrorism at the national level, whereas there is more focus 
on cyber-crime international and transnational levels. It is surprising that very little discussion is 
taking place at subnational and local levels, as both security challenges could have a large impact on 
a local scale. In addition, the main object of these security challenges being general public and 
private sector, both operating at local level.  
Sources: Physical safety and security is discussed in all sources in three case study countries, with 
government and parliament publications covering this core value most. Newspapers pay an 
approximately similar attention to this core value. The main difference is with academic publications: 
                                                          
96 See Appendix F for visual representation of the coding results  
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they hardly discuss physical safety and security in France and Netherlands, whereas it plays a large 
part of the academic discussion in the UK. On the other hand, French NGOs are concerned with 
physical safety and security more than other NGOs. Economic prosperity and security is also 
discussed in all the sources, however here the largest discussion in held by private sector (except for 
France, where all the sources discuss this core value in almost equal share). The UK and Dutch 
newspapers hardly touch upon these issues, whereas it seems to be an area of interest for the 
French media.  
Terrorism has a wider coverage in a diverse set of sources in all countries, with the national 
government publications playing the largest role when it comes to the discussion of terrorism, and 
private sector when it comes to the discussions of cyber-crime.  Newspapers also largely cover the 
threat of terrorism, whereas cyber-crime does not seem to interest them as much. This could be 
explained by the fact that terrorism-related stories attract more of the audience attention, as the 
terrorist attack would potentially have a large impact. Parliament and government publications have 
a more balanced coverage focusing on both issues, however slightly more attention is paid to 
terrorism. There is a sense that the issue of cyber-crime is being left to private businesses to resolve 
on its own, with only very few guidance from the government.  
NGOs are not discussing the most salient security challenges in the region; their main focus is on food 
supply, social stability and climate change (Figure 5). The focus of the NGOs’ discourse is not 
surprising: as has been demonstrated in national profiles, NGOs often address the importance of 
these issues. It should also be noted that the security challenges that are the most prominent in the 
NGO discourse are also prominent in all of the case study countries, although to a different extent 
(e.g. climate change and food supply are one of the most salient security challenges in the UK, 
whereas social stability are prominent in the Netherlands and France). 
 
Figure 5 Most frequently used security challenges as identified in the NGO publications 
Different publications focus on different levels when it comes to specific security challenges. For 
example, government publications cover various levels, and whilst national level is prominent 
(particularly in France and the UK), both terrorism and cyber-crime are discussed in the context of 
international and transnational levels. French government publications do not however discuss these 
security challenges at local and subnational levels. Private publications have a slightly different take: 
for instance, French business publications do not cover the threat of terrorism at all, whereas in the 
UK terrorism is only discussed at the national level. The Dutch publications, on the other hand, focus 
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on cyber-crime as a national issue, whereas the UK publications discuss these security challenges at 
all level. The focus of newspapers is also on a national level: it is particularly prominent in the UK in 
the context of cyber-crime that is only discussed at this level. Terrorism is however presented at both 
national and international levels, thus including in the discussion not only the effect but also the 
cause of the security challenge.  
Human rights and ethical issues: When it comes to the most salient security challenges discussed 
here, human rights and ethical issues are hardly touched upon: UK demonstrates the highest concern 
(although human rights are seen as a ‘mentioned’ rather than the ‘main’ topic, as has already been 
discussed in the UK profile). The Netherlands does not address the these issues at all when it comes 
to terrorism and cyber-crime, and France only briefly mentions them in parliament publications and 
newspaper. Overall in the NWE region human rights are most prominently discussed under the 
Physical safety and security and Social stability and security core values. The word cloud in Figure 6 
demonstrates the most frequently used words that describe coded sources relevant to human rights. 
 
Figure 6 Most frequently used words in the description of human rights context in the NWE region 
 
3.3 Historical trajectory  
First European Security Strategy was implemented in 2003, reviewed in 2008;97 and its updated 
version is coming out in 2015. The strategy was created in order to set out the potential security 
challenges to EU Member States, and to underline what the EU could do, by means of co-operation 
amongst its members, in response.  The five threats identified by the strategy are: 
• terrorism;  
• the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);  
• regional conflicts;  
• state failure; and 
• organised crime.   
                                                          
97 Lundin, E. From a European Security Strategy to a European Global Strategy: Ten Content-Related Issues. 2012. Occasional 
paper. Swedish Institute of International Affairs.  
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The Strategy emphasises that ‘in the context of ever-increasing globalisation, the internal and 
external aspects of security are inextricably linked’. Under the heading "Policy implications for 
Europe" the Strategy said that the EU needed to be more active ("preventive engagement”); more 
capable (transformation of the member states’ armed forces); more coherent ( better co-ordination); 
more effective ( working with partners). 98 
The Strategy was reinforced in 2009, with the greater emphasis on globalisation, and – due to EU’s 
expanded borders - with ‘a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern 
partnership’.99 Key security challenges pointed out in 2009 version of the Strategy include: 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Terrorism and Organised Crime; Cyber security; 
Energy Security; and Climate change.  
The Internal Security Strategy for EU was introduced in 2010; it was defined as ‘to enable the 
European Union to respond to existing and emerging threats to the security of European society, its 
citizens and organisations in the EU’.100 However it was recalled in 2014 and will be replaced by the 
latest Security Strategy in 2015. As outlined in draft documents and revisions of the new Strategy, 
the main threats for EU include: serious and organised crime; terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment 
and financing related to terrorism; cybercrime and the need for cyber security; threats and 
challenges stemming from the use of new technologies; crises and natural and man-made disasters; 
and new and emerging threats. A larger focus is also placed on developing connections with external 
threats, as ‘interdependence between internal and external security is constantly growing’. A special 
section is given to addressing human rights, which are the key for the security strategy.101 
As demonstrated in the countries profiles, being the most salient security challenges, terrorism and 
cyber-crime receive a lot attention from the policy makers, media, businesses and other actors.  
Terrorism and the events associated with it are perceived to change the security landscape of the 
NWE regions dramatically: a large number of the events, for instance, have been acknowledged by 
the security experts not only from the case study countries but also by other NWE countries (see 
Appendix G for a detailed timeline of terrorism-related events). This security challenge was listed as 
one of the key ‘influences’ considered to have shaped security perceptions and seen as significant 
defining moments in the ways that security has been understood and accounted for in political 
decision making (other ‘influencers’ included the end of the Cold War, the fall of Berlin wall etc). In 
particular, events in London (7/7 attacks) triggered the development of the EU counter-terrorism 
strategy.102 
Despite a long experience with terrorism Europe has only recently developed a comprehensive legal 
and institutional framework for counterterrorism.103 Terrorism is seen as a serious threat on the EU 
level and a large number of policies are dedicated to addressing this threat (Table 5). 
 
 
 
                                                          
98 EC. European Security Strategy. Brussels. 2003.  
99 EC. European Security Strategy: a Secure Europe in a better world. Brussels. 2009.  
100 EC. Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model, 5842/2/2010 
101 EC. Development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy. Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting. 4th 
December 2014.  
102 Devoic, B.. The post-9/11 European Union counterterrorism response: legal institutional framework.  2012. Naval 
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Table 5 Selected EU policies on terrorism 
Year Policy document 
2005 EU Counter-Terrorism strategy 
2008 Stepping up the fight against terrorism  
2010 Terrorist offences  
EU Internal security strategy 
Combating the financing of terrorism  
 
2011 
Prevention, preparedness and consequence 
management of terrorism 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
2014 Protecting Europe from terrorism risk 
Many of the EU strategies on combatting terrorism are developed together with the UN. EU’s 
counter-terrorism strategy is very similar to the one adopted in the UK and is based on four strands: 
Prevent, Protect, Pursue, Respond. It is pointed out that many of the European terrorist cells are 
located in the NWE region (the UK, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands),104with the EU 
and each of the countries’ responsible organisations trying to identify those in order to prevent 
future attacks, thus the salience of this security challenge in the NWE is not surprising.  
Internet related security challenges – including cyber-crime – are also gaining their prominence. 
Whilst not acknowledged as a separate threat in the 2003 European Security Strategy (although it 
was included in ‘Organised crimes’ section), cybersecurity became much more prominent in its 2009 
version and will receive a special emphasis in 2015 version.105 It is certainly considered as a salient 
security challenge judging by a variety and amount of various programmes, policies and regulations 
aimed at addressing this challenge (Table 6). 
Table 6 Selected cybercrime- related policy documents 
Year Title 
2009 Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure protection  
2011 Achievements and next steps: towards global cyber-security 
2012 Critical Information Infrastructure Protection: towards global 
cyber-security 
 
2013 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union – An Open, Safe 
and Secure Cyberspace 
Directive concerning measures to ensure a high common level of 
network and information security across the Union 
                                                          
104 Sanches, R. et al. Terror cell warning as Europe scrambles to handle threats. CNN News. 2015.  
105 EC. Development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy. Brussels. 2014.  
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Cybercrime is acknowledged to have a large effect on the European economy; thus the EC points out 
the importance of engaging with various stakeholders (including not only the businesses but also 
general public and in particular children) as well as cross border cooperation. 106 
As pointed out at the workshop, cyber-crimes – and cybersecurity overall – is still largely neglected 
due to the lack of understanding about technological developments. However some of the cyber-
security related events (such as 2012 DigiNotar cyberattack and 2014 Sony cyberattack) were 
acknowledged as influencers of future security discourse.  
 
3.4 Overview of current trends 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the findings of the coding exercise are generally aligned 
with the review of current EU policies. The most salient security challenges for the NWE region are 
also prominent in the EU policy discourse, and are becoming more so as the new EU Strategy is being 
implemented. These results go in line with the results of the NWE regional workshop that took place 
in January 2015 in London and is described in detail in Deliverable 7.1.107 The overall findings refer 
not only to the threats of terrorism and cyber-crime, but to other salient security challenges listed in 
section 3.1: EU has implemented an Energy Security Strategy;108 it runs a Food security thematic 
programme aimed at internal and external food supplies;109 and has developed an extensive EU 
Adaptation package with the EU Strategy to Climate Change at its heart. 110 However some 
differences were also found. For instance, as expected, the EU level documents promote cooperation 
among the member states as well as with the third country partners, however the specific countries 
that should take a lead on addressing a particular security challenge are rarely named. On the 
contrary, the case study countries – whilst mentioning cooperation, focus largely on their own 
efforts, capacities and capabilities in addressing various security challenges.  
Some differences also appeared in the way specific security challenges are perceived as the approach 
taken by the EU is not fully aligned with the approaches taken in the region. The coding results have 
demonstrated that whilst terrorism is acknowledged to be an international issue, it is largely dealt 
with on a national level (e.g. the coding results do not provide a clear picture about the international 
partners in fight against terrorism). This situation is much clearer on the EU level: it is stated that the 
EU cooperates on counter-terrorism with countries in the Western Balkans, the Sahel, North Africa, 
the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and North America, as well as in Asia, and with the US.111 Another 
difference is that for the EU one of the most difficult challenges in the development of a 
counterterrorism framework is the dilemma of security versus human rights: the European Union 
counterterrorism measures are as much as possible on the side of human rights while remaining 
effective. The coding results have not demonstrated such a close link to human rights: instead these 
were mainly neglected in the context of this security challenge.  
The NWE region overall demonstrates a good awareness of the cyber-crime issues: such, all the case 
study countries (and other counties in the region) have adopted national Cybersecurity Strategies 
                                                          
106 EC. A digital agenda for Europe: Cybersecurity. 2015.  
107 Chmutina,K., Bosher, L., Dainty, A. et al. Workshop Report: North-West Europe. 2015. Available at: http://evocs-
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108 EC. European Energy Security Strategy. 2014.  
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110 EC. The EU Strategy to Climate Change. 2013.  
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that  cover national infrastructure as well as private sectors.112 The coding results in general go in line 
with the approach taken by the EU, however NWE region analysis demonstrates that very little 
attention has been paid to general public – which is the main object of the security challnge – and 
their role in dealing with cybercrimes in the regional coding; whereas in Europe general public is 
prominently stated as one of the main addressees.  
The analysed countries share a large number of similarities (as has been demonstrated in coding 
results) but also differ in some aspects. The UK’s, France’s and the Netherlands’ security strategies 
were written in approximately the same time in late 2000s as they – and a region as a whole – were 
trying to redefine their approach to national security in light of changes in NATO and expansion of 
the EU. The national security strategies of these countries share similar way of adopting a risk-based 
‘all hazards’ and ‘all of society’ approach as the new security direction. The UK and the Netherlands 
are particularly similar in the way they are addressing the issues of security, whereas France has its 
specifics. One of the most prominent similarities is the focus on the same security issues, which is 
demonstrated by the salience of similar core values and security challenges. As demonstrated by the 
coding results, terrorism is a regional issue which, however, is mainly discussed at a national level. 
The discourse of terrorism includes not only terrorist attacks but also the issues of radicalisation (in 
particular in the UK and France) and polarisation (in the Netherlands and France). Supply-related 
threats (particularly energy supply) provide another good example: despite searching for new energy 
sources (e.g. fracking) and investing in renewable energy sources (e.g. PV and wind in Germany), 
NWE region is highly dependent on the fossil fuels supply from politically unstable regions (such as 
Russia). As demonstrated in the coding results, the main focus of the security discourse is on national 
level, with national actors playing the most prominent role across the region. At the same time, 
general public which is perceived as the main object of security challenges hardly plays any role in 
this discourse.  
There are some differences in the way security issues are addressed: for example, the Netherlands is 
very outward looking, with large focus on the international state (it has even implemented an 
International Security Strategy) 113. Both national and international strategies overlap, but it is the 
only country that explicitly states the role that international affairs play in its security discourse. 
Although France and the UK acknowledge the role of the international actors, they mainly discuss the 
issues at a national level. Another example is the perception of the roles within the EU: UK is seeing 
EU as mainly a trade partner (as many of its security deals are with the USA), whereas the 
Netherlands and France are more reliant on the EU in terms of security cooperation.  
The financial crisis of 2008 is included as a security issue in all the case studies countries, although 
the discussion of its implications for the security in the UK is largely absent, whereas in Netherlands 
and France it further reinforced the inward shift, with socio-economic dimensions (such as 
unemployment; health; security of the elderly; and pensions) attaining greater salience. 
The roles NWE region countries play in the EU is another interesting aspect that can influence the 
future developments in the security on the EU level. The NWE is the largest (in terms of the 
population and the wealth) in the EU. Whilst all three analysed countries acknowledge that the EU is 
critical for their security and prosperity, their roles within the EU security agenda differ. The EU acts 
                                                          
112 BSA. EU Cybersecurity Maturity Dashboard. 2015.  
113 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. International Security Strategy. 2013. Available at: http://www.government.nl/documents-and-
publications/notes/2013/06/21/international-security-strategy.html 
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as a bloc with all 27 member states discussing issues and unanimously making decisions, but many 
argue that behind the scenes lies a tacit agreement that the Big Three - France, Germany, and the UK 
-  take the lead on foreign policy, including security matters.114 In 1998, the UK and France were 
authors of the Saint-Malo declaration, which led to the creation of the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy.115 These two countries continue to play important roles in the EU security 
(particularly in NATO), but they are also very protective of their sovereignty.116 Another strong player 
whose role has evolved since the fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany; however the relationship with 
Germany within the region is complex. Whilst searching for solutions to similar security challenges 
(such as global terrorism, sustained instability and uncertainty at Europe’s borders), German and 
British starting points and long terms goals often differ dramatically.117 Similarly, France whilst 
criticising others for neither willing to nor letting their interests converge towards EU common 
interests, itself hardly conforms to this common interest.118 Netherlands on the other hand 
prioritises integration with EU also pursue defence cooperation within Europe, both multilaterally - in 
the context of the Western European Union and the European Security and Defence Policy of the EU 
- and bilaterally, as in the German-Netherlands Corps.119 This national stances and roles played in the 
overall EU security have to be taken into account on the broader European level.  
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115 Lidington, D. EU Common Security and Defence Policy: The UK Perspective. 2012.  
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4. Findings and conclusions 
4.1 Summary of the country and regional profiles 
The NWE region shares similarities but also has very specific differences; security however is at the 
top of the agenda in the region which is demonstrated by the existence of the National Security 
Strategies in analysed countries and specific security strategies for particular security challenges.  
The UK has a clear strategy of preventing and responding to the main security challenges its facing –
which go in line with the coding results. UK’s security agenda co-exists with the resilience agenda, the 
implementation of which is largely the responsibility of the local governments. The main security 
challenges identified in the UK are terrorism, cyber-crime, climate change and natural hazards, and 
energy and good supply, with the most salient core values being physical safety and security, 
economic prosperity and security, and environmental and ecological security.  
In France, the security challenges as well as the most salient core values are deeply rooted in the 
cultural and social backgrounds (for instance the causes of the social disorders or riots) of the Nation; 
it has the largest focus on the social challenges in the region. The main core values are physical 
security, political instability, social security and economic prosperity. French security profile 
represents and to an extend mirrors a turning point for the European security policies, due to its 
attention to the international alliances and conflicts around the world and their influences and 
effects on the international political scenario.  French security profile can be defined such as a 
multicultural and multidimensional model aimed at managing the crises and disasters at national and 
international levels.  
The Netherlands is, in many respects, one of most peaceful and prosperous countries in the world. 
Traditionally security did not top the list of citizens’ concerns. But international developments of 
recent have changed this. Instability in the Middle East, the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, the rivalry 
with Russia and the downing of MH17 in the summer of 2014—in which 196 Dutch citizens died — 
each contribute to this change. In addition to these international developments, a number of 
domestic challenges have stirred new concerns, most notably the gas drilling induced earthquakes in 
Groningen. The main security challenges identified in the Netherlands are instability and terrorism 
and cyber-challenges in tandem with the four most salient core values physical safety and security, 
economic prosperity and security, and social stability and security closely followed by territorial 
security.  
4.2 Key findings  
As the result of the coding exercise, workshop discussions and extensive literature review, following 
findings deem to be critical for understanding the future developments in the security discourse in 
the NWE region:  
− France uniqueness: French security discourse is closer to the discourse of South-West 
Europe (Deliverable 5.2) than to the NWE.  
− Future trends: The current most salient security challenges will remain such in the nearest 
future although their prominence may change;  
− Events vs trends: More attention is paid on ‘hard security’ threats that can be associated 
with specific events. For example, terrorism is highly visible, the actions of prevention are 
clear and thus it is easier to prioritise such events over, for instance, climate change, the 
impacts of which do not occur on a regular basis (although are becoming more frequent).  
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− Complexities: The core values are intertwined; thus it is virtually impossible to refer a 
specific security challenge or to a specific singular core value. Similarly, it is extremely 
difficult to identify specific security challenges as they are closely interrelated and are linked 
to one another;  
− Globalisation: It is becoming impossible to think about security in domestic (national) 
context only, as the majority of security challenges are influenced by the situation abroad 
(either in a specific country or on a global level); 
− Localisation:  At the same time - whilst operating at a global level and being influenced by 
the global and international events - security ‘is coming home’:120 this is demonstrated by the 
responsibilities taken up by the local governments and private businesses that act locally.  
− Nationalisation: National level is the most prominent level of the security discourse. National 
governments and parliaments are the most active actors: they pose as addressors and 
addressees, although they are not often seen as objects.  
− Regional focus: Whilst the NWE region countries cooperate in security area and promote 
integration of the EU, they are not in a rush to cooperate with other – newer – EU member 
states.  
− Multi-stakeholder engagement: No single actor, be it the national government, national 
parliament, or the private sector can address issues pertaining to cyber-crime alone. As a 
result, there is a need for concerted efforts, and a multi-stakeholder approach to address 
these issues – both at the domestic and international level. At the domestic level, 
governments have to cooperate and coordinate with the private sector, through sharing best 
practices and expertise. At the international level, governments should further increase 
cooperation with other foreign governments. 
− Dialogues: There is a strong relationship between governmental institutions and private 
sector, however general public is largely excluded from this conversation. At the same time, 
the dialogue does not lead to a large number of actions taken together by the governments 
and private stakeholder.  
− Widening of security discourse: Non-security events have become securitised, because such 
action helps to quickly mobilise resources. For instance, by securitising ‘immigration’ it could 
make it more ‘justifiable’ for policy makers to mobile resources to deal with the threat of 
immigration (irrespective of whether immigration actually poses a security threat or not).    
− Human rights: Human rights are not well reflected in the coding documents, however this 
does not mean that human rights and ethical value are overlooked. Instead it is highly 
probable that human and ethical values are intrinsic to the NWE region discussion of security 
and are therefore ‘taken for granted’.  
− Cultural differences: Cultural identity is not seen as a salient core value, however the trends 
in polarisation and radicalisation in the region are becoming more and more prominent, 
which may increase the saliency of this core value in the future. 
− Similar story but different coverage: Various sources across the region tell the same story in 
a different manner. For example, climate change is seen as a cause which has to be mitigated 
in the policy documents whereas media mainly focuses on its impacts (i.e. natural hazards 
such as flood). 
Overall, the results of the NWE region analysis demonstrate that the existing security challenges will 
remain salient in the nearest future and addressing them require thinking about the global context 
that can become a driver of the negative influences upon national and local security. Security has 
been re-framed from national interest to a more local human security-oriented discourse, but at the 
same national, even regional interest are becoming important again.  
                                                          
120 Coaffee, J and Murakami Wood, D. Security is coming home: rethinking scale and constructing resilience in the global urban 
response to terrorist risk. International Relations. 20 (4), 503-17, 2006.  
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6. Appendices  
Appendix A: UK profile: graphical 
representation of the coding results  
 
Figure 7 Role of different actors in the analysed salient security challenges  
 
Figure 8 Security challenges discussed by different Addressors 
 
Figure 9 Comparison across the actors: Who has the largest say? 
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Figure 10 Comparison of the addressees: who's been talked to the most? 
 
Figure 11 Discourse of security challenges addressed towards Addressees 
 
Figure 12 Who is the main object of security challenges? 
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Figure 13 Security challenges that different objects are most vulnerable to  
 
Figure 14 Security challenges as discussed at different levels sources (as the main topic) 
 
Figure 15 Distribution of discussions about different security challenges at different levels 
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Figure 16 Discussions on various security challenges by different sources at different levels 
 
Figure 17 Various levels as covered by different sources 
 
Figure 18 The share of the most prominent core values as covered in different sources  
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Figure 19 Most prominent security challenges as covered in different sources 
 
Figure 20 Human and ethical values as addressed in different security challenges 
 
 
Figure 21 Human and ethical values covered by various sources with relation to different security 
challenges 
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Appendix B: Timeline of main terrorism events and policies in the UK121 
Year Terrorism Acts and 
related publications  
Description Other terrorism-related 
government publications  
Terrorist attacks and terrorism 
related events 
2000 The Terrorism Act - gave a broad definition of terrorism for the first time; 
- provided an extended list of proscribed terrorist organisations 
beyond those associated with Northern Ireland; 
- allowed police to detain terrorist suspects for questioning for up to 
7 days; 
- allowed police to stop and search any person or vehicle in 
designated areas without the need to suspect that person 
 IRA terrorist attacks in London122 in 
June, July and September  
2001 The Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security 
Act 
- contained measures that had been rejected from the 2000 Act; 
- allowed Police to operate outside of military bases even for non-
terrorist cases; 
- enabled foreigners to be detained as terrorist suspects indefinitely; 
- required annual renewal of some provisions in recognition of the 
political climate 
 9/11 
 
IRA terrorist attacks in London (in 
march, May and August) and 
Birmingham (November)  
2003 Criminal Justice Act - doubled the period of detention of a terrorist suspect for 
questioning to 14 days; 
- justified by the claim that forensic analysis of chemical weapons 
materials might not be complete in 7 day 
 Bomb attacks on the British 
consulate and the HSBC building in 
Islamabad  
2004   Civil Contingencies Act Attack on British nationals in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; 
British national is kidnaped and 
killed in Iraq   
2005 The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 
- established the "control order" (a form of house arrest)  London 7/7 bombings 
 
2006 The Terrorism Act - defined the offence of "glorifying" terrorism; 
- revised the period of detention of terrorist suspect without charge 
up to 28 days; 
- justified by the claim that necessary evidence to decide charges 
might be encrypted on one of thousands of hard disks, and it could 
take this long to search them 
Countering international 
terrorism: the UK strategy  
 
The Terrorism (UN - allowed the Treasury to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists   
                                                          
121It is also important to bear in mind that other non-terrorism issues may have influenced the development of terrorism related policies (i.e. fuel strike/ blockages, floods, overseas conflicts involving 
the UK etc.). However these will not be discussed in this report.  
122 Cells in green are the IRA related attacks; in purple are Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda inspired related 
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Measures) Order  
2007    Glasgow International Airport attack 
2008 The Counter- 
terrorism Act 
- allowed police questioning of suspects after they have been charged; 
- required convicted terrorist to notify the police of their whereabouts;  
- extended extra-territorial jurisdiction of courts over terrorism 
offences overseas; 
- interpreted as banning all photographs of the police in public places 
National Security Strategy: 
security in an 
interdependent world  
Exeter attempted bombing  
Attacks in Northern Ireland  
2009 The Coroner and 
Justice Act  
- extends sentencing provisions in Criminal Justice Act 2003 to 
terrorism offences 
 Attacks in Northern Ireland  
British national killed and kidnapped 
in North Africa  
2010 Terrorist Asset-
Freezing Act  
 National Security strategy: 
a strong Britain in an age of 
uncertainty  
Attack on British diplomats in Sana, 
Yemen  
Attacks in Northern Ireland 
2012 The Protection of 
Freedoms Act 
- provisions in respect of the destruction, retention, and use of 
fingerprints, footwear impressions and DNA samples; 
- reformed aspects of the powers to enter land; 
- removed the 'stop and search' regulations 
Managing the risk to 
transport networks from 
terrorism and other crimes 
 
  Protecting the UK against 
terrorism  
 
2013   Improving the UK's ability 
to absorb, respond to and 
recover from emergencies 
Murder of Lee Rigby   
 
  National Risk Register of 
Civil Emergencies 
 
2015 Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 
- enables the seizure and retention of the passport of a person 
suspected of leaving the UK for the purpose of a terrorism-related 
activity outside the UK,  
- enable the “temporary” exclusion (for up to two years) of 
individuals from the UK if they are believed to be involved in 
terrorism-related activity outside the UK 
- enables the retention of data to identify responsible for sending a 
communication on the Internet or accessing an Internet 
communications service. 
- new security arrangements are included regarding aviation, 
maritime, and rail transport. 
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Appendix C: Timeline of main natural hazards 
and climate change related policies in the UK 
 
Year Natural hazards Climate change  
2000  Climate Change Programme  
2004 Civil Contingencies Act  
2005 Making space for water 
2008 Planning Act Climate Change Act 
2009 The Flood Risk Regulations  
 
2010 
Flood and Water Management Act  
Strategic framework on improving the 
resilience of critical infrastructure to 
disruptions from natural hazards 
 
2011 Natural Hazards and Infrastructure: Keeping the country running 
2012  The UK climate change risk assessment  
 
 
 
2013 
National Risk Register of Civil 
Emergencies 
Adapting to Climate Change 
Improving UK’s ability to absorb, 
respond to and recover from 
emergencies 
 
Reducing the threats of flooding and 
coastal change 
 
The national adaptation programme: making the country resilient to a changing 
climate 
2014 The national flood emergency 
framework for England 
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Appendix D: Timeline of the main events 
relevant to the most salient security challenges 
in France 
YEAR EVENTS 
1994 The hijacking of the Air France flight 8969 
1995 A series of nuclear tests were conducted in the Pacific Ocean 
1996 A nuclear test at Muruora Island  
1996 A bomb attack attributed to the Armed Islamic Group against the Gare de Port–Royal in Paris 
1998  A terrorist attack by Corsican nationalists who murdered Claude Érignac, prefect of Corsica 
1999 Dramatic storm  
2001 The factory of AZF de Toulouse was destroyed by an explosion of a stock of ammonia nitrate 
2003 An extraordinary heat wave 
2005 Social disorder: French banlieue (Paris) 
2008 Economic crisis and its impact on social protection system and health care system  
2013 Flooding in the Hautes Pyrenees region  
2013 An attack by an Islamist on a French soldier in La Défense, a suburb of Paris. 
2013  Attack on a French soldier and it seemed like a religious terrorist attack. 
2014  The Dijon attack when a man ran into pedestrians with his car yelling Allah u Akbar 
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Appendix E: Netherlands profile: graphical 
representation of the coding results  
 
 
Figure 22 Role of different actors in the analysed salient security challenges 
 
Figure 23 Most prominent security challenges as covered in different sources 
 
Figure 24 Security challenges discussed by different Addressors 
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Figure 25 Comparison across the actors: Who has the largest say?  
 
Figure 26 Comparison of the Addressees: who’s been talked to the most?  
 
Figure 27 Discourse of security challenges addressed towards Addressees 
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Figure 28 Who is the main object of security challenges?  
 
Figure 29 Security challenges that different objects are vulnerable to 
 
Figure 30 Security challenges as discussed at different levels sources 
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Figure 31 Distribution of discussions about different security challenges at different levels 
 
 
Figure 32 The share of the most prominent core values as covered in different sources 
 
Figure 33 Various levels as covered by different sources 
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Appendix F: Description of the security 
challenges, political actors, levels, and ethics 
and human rights in the North-West region 
 
Figure 34 Addressors of the most salient security challenges 
 
Figure 35 Addressees of the most salient security challenges 
 
Figure 36 Objects of the most salient security challenges 
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Figure 37 Overall representation of actors in the NWE region123 
 
Figure 38 Levels of discourse 
 
Figure 39 Overview of the levels of discussion in the NWE region 
                                                          
123 Based on the most salient threats 
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Figure 40 Core values as covered by various sources in the case study countries 
 
Figure 41 Overview of the discussion about the most prominent values in various sources across the NWE region 
 
Figure 42 Coverage of the most salient security challenges in different sources  
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Figure 43 Overview of the coverage of the most salient security challenges by various sources in the NWE region 
 
Figure 44 Levels of discussion about the most salient security challenges in government publications 
 
Figure 45 Levels of discussion about the most salient security challenges in business publications 
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Figure 46 Levels of discussion about the most prominent security challenges in newspapers 
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Appendix G: List of the ‘influences’ relevant to 
terrorism threat identified by the workshop 
participants 
 
1992 
El Al plane flew into flat in Amsterdam  
PIRA condone bombings between 1992-1996 
Bomb in London 
1993 
Bomb in London 
1996 
PIRA Bomb in London 
Manchester PIRA bombing 
1997 
Good Friday Agreement  
2000 
UK Terrorism Act  
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
2001 
9/11 Attacks in USA  
2002 
Theo Van Gogh murder in Netherlands  
2003 
Pim Fortuyn murder in Netherlands  
CONTEST strategy in UK 
2004 
Madrid Bombings  
2005 
7/7 bombings in London  
Prevention of Terrorism Act in UK  
 
 
2007  
Glasgow Airport attack in UK 
Transatlantic bombing plot leads to screening 
of liquids & body scans  
2008 
Prevent Strategy in the UK (revised)  
Mumbai terrorist attacks  
Nicky Reilly lone wolf attack in Exeter, UK  
2009 
Detroit failed aviation terrorist attack 
2010 
Ink cartridge bomb plot 
2011 
Anders Breivik attacks in Norway  
Death of Osama Bin Laden 
2012 
London Olympics security 
Operation Yewtree in the UK 
2013 
Lee Rigby murder  
Brussels synagogue attack 
2014 
ISIL videod executions  
Boko Haram school girl kidnappings  
UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 
2015 
Attack on Charlie Hebdo 
Kosher supermarket attack in Paris 
 
 
